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Chapter 1: Introduction
In 2006, Muhammad Yunus won the Nobel Peace Prize for his work in microcredit.
Since then the subject of microfinance has become inescapable in discussions of poverty
reduction and development, as some have proclaimed that the means to end poverty has finally
been found. Of course, that conclusion is overstated. Although the practice is attracting a great
deal of attention in the media and among non-governmental organizations, rigorous academic
investigation of microcredit’s short- and long-term impacts is lacking. No strong empirical
evidence exists that microloans lead to economic improvement in a country, and even its
individual-level effects are mixed. Influential institutions like the UN and USAID are pouring
resources into these programs without a thorough knowledge of their efficacy.
How can we go about evaluating the success of microcredit at creating “economic and
social development from below,” as phrased by the Nobel Committee? The first evaluations of
microcredit were not conducted in a very rigorous manner, leading to an overly positive
depiction of their impacts. Subsequent studies have shown that the individual effects of
microcredit are far more mixed than originally supposed. According to a few recent studies,
anywhere between 10% and 25% of participants in microcredit programs actually go bankrupt
after receiving loans, while only another quarter show gains (Mosley 1996a, 1996b).
Significantly more study is needed before we can make any strong conclusions concerning the
individual level effects of microcredit, especially broad and methodologically rigorous study, but
it is clear that closer examination is in fact necessary; microcredit simply is not the panacea some
had assumed it would be. I attempt to help clarify these phenomena by providing another
perspective on the individual-level effects of microcredit.
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All the same, the pioneers of microfinance did not envision that their creation would be
limited to individuals. It is also assumed to affect the children of recipients. If microcredit affects
borrowers, then it almost certainly affects their children in some ways, which could have more
far-reaching consequences. Of the recent scholarship on microcredit, most is conducted by
economists and does not focus on societal impact (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 5). Those
who do usually consider a few second-generation effects, perhaps level of education of the
children of borrowers, but those are rarely the focus of study (Bayuglen 2008, 527, 539). Rather,
they seem to be considered as supporting evidence for the hypothesis that microcredit has an
individual-level, first-generation effect. Without scholarship on second-generation effects, how
can we evaluate whether the long-term goals of microcredit are being met? My study is a starting
point aimed to fill that gap in the literature. By directly gathering information from recipients of
microloans in Guatemala, I am able to give some interesting preliminary answers to the secondgeneration question.
Another recurring theme in the microcredit literature concerns the empowerment of
women. These programs are often targeted at women, bringing them into closer contact with the
formal economy and providing a source of personal income. Some scholars believe that children
benefit when women are given more control over household expenditures, as women are
hypothesized to be more interested than men in diverting resources to their offspring rather than
to themselves (Skoufias 2001). Thus when a mother receives a loan, her children should be
healthier and better educated than those of a father receiving a loan, all other things being equal.
This is a contentious hypothesis, though. Some studies have shown that mothers tend to
distribute family resources disproportionately to male children, and that mothers involved in
microcredit are more likely than non-borrowing mothers to keep their daughters home from
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school to help them with their businesses (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 221; Mayoux and
Johnson 1997). Others say that there is no difference between the way mothers and fathers
distribute resources to their children (Roodman and Morduch 2009). Since the literature is quite
mixed on this point, my study offers another window into the processes at work.
The broadest research questions I aim to investigate, then, focus in turn on borrowers and
their children. First, does receiving a microloan really improve individual well-being? How do
any such material changes affect the children of borrowers? It is probable that the people who
receive microloans were not seriously invested in formal aspects of the economy before
becoming borrowers (World Bank 2004, 1). By becoming involved in microfinance, it stands to
reason that many loan recipients also become involved in the formal economy for the first time.
Does this cause any other lifestyle or value changes for the borrower and her children? Finally,
do the children of female borrowers experience stronger effects than the children of male
borrowers due to a gender-based difference in household expenditure preferences?
My argument draws from the strongest sections, and sometimes the conventional
wisdom, of the microcredit literature. I hypothesize that microcredit does positively influence the
economic situation of borrowers. Since borrowers should accordingly have more resources to
direct to their children than their peers in similar pre-loan economic situations, the offspring of
loan recipients should be healthier and better educated. The childbirth patterns of these children
should reflect their higher level of education; therefore they should have fewer children and at a
later age than the offspring of non-borrowers.
These material effects are not the only important ones, however. Most Guatemalans work
in low-skill jobs outside of the formal economy. Receiving a microloan brings them into closer
contact with the formal sector. If the microloan also results in an improved economic situation,

3

the borrower should come to associate involvement in the formal economy with increased wellbeing. In addition, the positive experience with microcredit should make them feel empowered to
control their financial futures, something we could call entrepreneurship or “economic selfefficacy.”1 Recipients of microloans, then, should feel a stronger sense of economic self-efficacy
than non-borrowers. It is possible that microcredit does not increase an individual’s sense of selfefficacy, but rather that people with a higher sense of economic self-efficacy seek out loan
programs. In that case, microcredit does not increase self-efficacy, but it does facilitate the
expression of that sense. Therefore it is possible that microcredit causes an increase in selfefficacy, or loan involvement may simply be correlated with that increase. All of this means that
the loan recipient now sees entrepreneurial activities in the formal economy as the path to
betterment, and he or she is more able and likely to emphasize education for his or her children
and to encourage them to take high-skill jobs in the formal economy. In other words, a parent’s
sense of economic self-efficacy and trust in the formal economy is passed on to his or her child.
Given that I cannot directly interview the children I must attempt to indirectly determine whether
or not this occurs. Hence I hypothesize that a heightened sense of economic self-efficacy and
trust in the formal economy manifests in children in the jobs they take. Children of loan
recipients should be more likely than those of non-recipients to hold high-skill jobs in the formal
economy, and to delay childbirth in order to pursue such careers.
Children who are well educated, healthy, have a strong sense of economic self-efficacy
and a desire to work in high-skill jobs planted in them by their parents are more likely to be
successful actors in the formal economy. If these second-generation effects do exist, then over
time many more lives than just those of the borrowers could be affected by microcredit. The
1

According to political scientist Orsan Bayulgen (2008, 525), the material benefits, “self-efficacy” and “social
capital” generated by involvement in microcredit should bring about general societal development, increasing the
likelihood of economic growth.
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number of recipients of microcredit is only growing, in Guatemala and around the world. As
more and more children grow up with better individual living conditions and a stronger value
placed in the home on preparation for involvement in high-skill jobs in the formal economy, the
general level of economic development in that country could increase. It is still too early to
detect this trend on a country level if it exists, since microfinance has only been influential for
around twenty years. Nonetheless this period of time is sufficient to glean whether or not effects
exist on a second-generation level, and if they do, future study should attempt to ascertain
whether microcredit could possibly have a macro-level effect.
Finally, gender should have an effect on all of these hypotheses. I expect that the children
of female borrowers will be more healthy and educated than those of male borrowers, more
likely to hold high-skill jobs, and less likely to give birth often and at a young age. If women are
indeed more likely than men to pour their earnings into the well-being of their family, as
evidenced by these indicators, it would be fortunate that women outnumber men as microfinance
borrowers and beneficial to continue to disproportionately encourage women into the practice.
In order to provide some preliminary answers to these questions I conducted survey
research in Western Guatemala during two weeks in January 2011. The largest institution in the
country dedicated expressly to providing microcredit, Fundación Génesis Empresarial,
graciously agreed to give me access to their clients and to help me find non-borrowers to
interview as well. I returned with 97 interviews conducted with 68 Guatemalans who had
received a microloan at some point in their lives, and 29 who had never received a formal loan.
In the sample of their 306 children, the parents of 94 had never received a loan, while the parents
of 212 had received a loan at some point. I investigated my eight hypotheses using quantitative
analysis of these data. My sample was in many ways one of convenience, so I do not attempt to
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conduct a study broad and rigorous enough from which to draw strong conclusions. Rather I
hope to explore the plausibility of further in-depth research on these under-studied and important
topics.
My thesis aims to address a number of long-debated puzzles in the literature, as well as
investigate new ones. The ideas that gender may lead to different levels of household
expenditures and that personal well-being may be increased through receiving microloans have
been extensively discussed, but no definitive answers have been reached. On the other hand, the
second-generation social effects of microfinance have not been widely investigated. My idea that
increased involvement in the formal sector and a heightened sense of economic self-efficacy
result in a trust in the high-skill formal economy that is passed on to the borrower’s children is
also a new contribution. My original data and analysis seek to explore possible avenues of
fruitful research within these gaps in the literature, providing information that is at the same time
important for real-world policy application as governments and organizations pour resources into
microfinance without a solid understanding of its effects and value.
In this introduction I have established the research questions to be pursued, their
relevance to scholarship and policy, the basic state of the research on microcredit and its secondgeneration effects, and a sketch of my argument concerning how I believe the research question
will be answered. In the following section I present a more detailed overview of the literature on
microcredit, hitting on the main veins of study as well as scholarship focused particularly on
second-generation effects. I also present the eight hypotheses derived from this literature that aim
to answer the main research question, namely whether microcredit has a positive impact in
general and more specifically on the children of recipients and when the borrower is female. In
the third chapter I present my research design, then focus on the survey instrument itself and the
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manner in which it was conducted. Next I describe the various variables constructed with the
survey data and how they were used to quantitatively test my hypotheses. In Chapter 4 I present
the results of this analysis and illustrate them with vignettes from the surveys. I begin with the
four hypotheses concerning the material and social effects of microcredit, then move to the three
hypotheses concerning personal effects. Finally I discuss the results found for the male-versusfemale recipient hypothesis. In the final chapter I summarize my findings and discuss their
implications.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Hypotheses
Little strong empirical evidence exists that microloans lead to second-generation
improvements, and studies concerning their first-generation effects come to mixed conclusions
(Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, Honohan 2004, Ledgerwood 1999). Many anecdotal and case
study accounts of the myriad effects of microfinance exist, but due to selection bias these tend to
be overly glowing evaluations (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 267). Of the more
methodologically careful existing studies, most have been conducted by economists and
therefore focus on financial and purely economic topics. Consequently, work “estimating [the]
social impacts” of microcredit is lacking, since little rigorous, broad study has been conducted on
this topic (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 5). Scholars have pointed out that involvement in
microcredit allows borrowers to “invest… in their children’s future,” but few “large-impact”
studies have been conducted to test whether or not they truly do so (Bayuglen 2008, 527, 539). I
am, nonetheless, able to draw from some important works that attempt to evaluate the social
influence of microcredit.
Microfinance includes a number of financial services like insurance, savings and credit
(Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 15). Microcredit, then, is a form of microfinance, particularly
referring to small loans given to people with low incomes, usually with the expectation that the
funds will be invested in small personal businesses and paid back once the new entrepreneur
turns a profit. In the 1980s the Grameen Bank pioneered work in this field by forming local
groups of borrowers to share expertise and exert peer pressure among themselves in order to
grow their businesses and promptly repay the loans (Bayuglen 2008, 525). Much early theory on
microfinance focused on this group-borrowing mechanism and its possible economic, social and
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political effects. In economics it was posited that group lending lessened risk by increasing the
probability that borrowers would repay on time (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 98; Bayuglen
2008, 534). Other social scientists focused on the “social capital” built by these interactions, and
how that capital could be translated into political advocacy (Bayuglen 2008). While this is the
most developed line of theoretical thought in the non-economic microfinance literature, it may
not be the most fruitful. Evidence is gathering that microcredit can be effective without group
lending (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 161). Conclusions remains mixed, but even major
institutions like the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh have moved away from the group-lending
model to more individually based loans. As the importance of the group-lending thesis seems to
be lessening, and because the mechanism is not directly pertinent to my research, I do not
incorporate it in my study. However, I am able to control for the manner in which the
respondents to my survey receive their loans. Of the 68 loan recipients I surveyed, 31 receive
individual business loans, 24 have group business loans, and 13 have individual home loans.
These are included as control variables in the analyses.

2.1

Economics-based literature
The next main body of literature on microcredit is based in economics, especially non-

neoclassical economics. According to the basic economic principle of diminishing marginal
returns, capital should flow to where it produces the largest returns (Armendáriz and Morduch
2010, 6). Poor business owners have a higher return to capital than rich ones, so money should
flow from the rich to the poor (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 7). This obviously does not occur
in reality. Economists use the ideas of adverse selection and moral hazard to explain this
phenomenon, and show how microfinance lessens these problems in order to get capital to the
poor (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 8-9). Economists also focus on the implications of forms
9

of microfinance other than microcredit, like savings and insurance. Much of the literature
investigates which institutional arrangements yield economic benefits, how microfinance
institutions can turn a profit and how they should be managed, how much commercialization and
regulation is necessary, and why microfinance may or may not be more successful than other
similar credit-providing arrangements. There are even multiple textbooks dedicated to these
questions (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, Ledgerwood 1999, Ledgerwood and White 2006,
Rhyne 2009, Robinson 2001).
These areas of focus in the literature illustrate a point I touched upon in the introduction
to this chapter: the main body of rigorous academic work on microcredit is conducted by
economists, but little of that research focuses particularly on the social effects of receiving
microloans. It centers on income increases, solvency of the microcredit institutions themselves,
and increased access to credit, instead of social effects like changes in health, education and birth
rate. Most economists support the “financial systems” approach to lending, which focuses on
getting loans to the “economically active poor” who do not have access to traditional loans but
are capable of paying them back (Robinson 2001, 22). This stands in contrast to the “poverty
lending approach,” like that of the Grameen Bank, in which the focus is lifting people from
poverty (Robinson 2001, 22). The research of most economists, then, does not directly address
poverty alleviation; they are interested in getting credit to more of the population, which
presumably has a positive effect on income. The textbook I reference that most explicitly argues
in favor of the financial systems approach does not include studies that investigate the social
impacts of microcredit. The big questions like “Can microfinance help the economically active
poor increase their incomes?” are answered with a section dedicated to a handful of personal
vignettes.
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This is a very different focus than the mainstream “poverty lending” attitude toward
microcredit. Unlike most economists, I choose to evaluate microcredit as a tool to alleviate
poverty, as that is the goal for which most organizations employ microcredit and for which
microcredit is publicized. This approach is also appropriate, since the foundation I worked with
in Guatemala subscribes to it. Fundación Génesis Empresarial (FGE) is a non-profit, and when I
landed in Guatemala they were adamant that I meet with upper-level members of management so
that they could describe to me the philosophy and goals of the foundation. In a nutshell, FGE
wants to help people, and they want to do that by making loans accessible to those who
otherwise could not get them, as well as by teaching them valuable skills to enable the recipient
to make good use of the loans.
I turn to the economic literature for two of my hypotheses: that microcredit leads to
individual economic gain, and that participation in microcredit leads to increased involvement in
the formal economy. The economic literature points out that most recipients of microloans were
excluded from “conventional financial systems” before they found microcredit (Bayuglen 2008,
526). Those considered “unbankable” are the main borrowers of microcredit, typically the poor
and members of other marginalized groups (Bayuglen 2008, 526, 531). The informal sector of an
economy is characterized by lack of government regulation, and wages significantly below those
of workers in the formal sector (Cohn 2005, 391). Most of these borrowers had little contact with
the formal economy before microloans (World Bank 2004). Microcredit brings these groups into
the market economy through the credit apparatus; however, they remain mostly informal
members of the market. Therefore the economic literature provides a great deal of support for
my hypothesis that microcredit brings borrowers into closer contact with the formal economy.
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Given the “financial systems” focus of the economics literature on microcredit, only a
small portion shares my goal of attempting to determine whether involvement in microcredit has
positive social effects. These tests are also focused mostly on first-generation outcomes. Many
are formal impact analyses, which attempt to find whether a program has achieved its intended
goal (Ledgerwood 1999, 46). Impact analyses investigate the economic, “sociopolitical” and
personal effects of microcredit programs (Ledgerwood 1999, 47). As I and numerous other
authors have noted, we are lacking this type of study. Due to the expense of conducting them,
both researchers and the lending institutions themselves do not undertake enough impact analysis
(Ledgerwood 1999, 48). My study addresses this paucity of literature. It is not exactly an impact
analysis; my sample includes borrowers from a number of institutions, and even though the bulk
of respondents are from one institution, that foundation does not have explicit goals outside of
poverty reduction. However, I do investigate all three kinds of effects. I look at the
straightforward economic or material impact of the program and at the social effects seen in
children’s level of education and health. The personal effects that I consider are the impacts of
increased involvement in the formal economy and an increased sense of individual
entrepreneurship on the value a person assigns to interacting with the formal, high-skill
economy. If borrowers have a values shift due to involvement in microcredit and come to have a
higher personal estimation of the worth to be derived from working in the formal economy, then
they should be more likely to push their children in that career direction.
Within the limited impact-analysis literature focused on poverty alleviation, many
authors assert that microcredit leads to increased personal economic well-being. One of the most
well-known studies is that of Khandkar and Pitt (1998), who showed that for every loan of 100
taka, the Bangladeshi currency, household expenditures by female borrowers increased by 18
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taka.2 Another 1998 study found that when education was combined with a microloan program
in Ghana, the income of women in the program was double that of non-borrowers (McNelly and
Dunford 1998). Multiple studies in Bangladesh, China and Madagascar have found that
involvement in microcredit leads to an increase in available calories in the home (Zeller and
Meyer 2002). There is a body of research that explores the second-generation effects of
microcredit, but usually as a side note to the already limited amount of literature focused on firstgeneration impact analysis. Evidence exists, though, supporting my hypothesis that involvement
in microcredit has positive second-generation impacts. For instance, a study using survey data in
Tanzania found that access to credit through microloans “acts as a substitute for child labor”
(Honohan 2004, 24). In addition, a significant amount of literature exists extolling the virtues of
microcredit, but the glowing nature of these many accounts is often due to cherry-picking of
successful cases (e.g. Smith and Thurman 2007, with foreword by Muhammad Yunus). One such
book rosily proclaims that microcredit specifically can play a very important role in “cutting
poverty in half by 2015” (Daley-Harris and Awimbo 2006).
However, the evidence is not uniformly supportive of the proposition that access to
microcredit invariably betters the borrower’s welfare. According to a study conducted in Bolivia,
around twenty-five percent of loan recipients had “spectacular gains” after borrowing microloans
(Mosley 1996b). However, 60 to 65 percent of borrowers “stayed about the same,” while 10 to
15 percent actually went bankrupt (Mosley 1996). Another study from India found that about
half of recipients gained, while around 25 percent stayed the same and another 25 percent lost
(Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 268). Studying the Grameen Bank itself, one author concluded
that the economic situation of 77% of clients stayed more or less the same (Islam 2007, 166). As
for second-generation effects, the conclusions are mixed as well. According to a study of
2

The gendered component of their research will be discussed in Section 2.2.
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microfinance institution SHARE in India, involvement increased male children’s level of
education, but not that of female children (Copestake et al. 2005, 82). Multiple studies have
found no effect of receiving microcredit on child nutrition (Zeller and Meyer 2002). Many
economists, especially those of the financial systems approach, argue that microcredit by itself is
not enough to have a positive impact. They argue that voluntary savings programs and other
forms of microfinance are a better choice than microcredit alone, and that microcredit in its best
form is coupled with savings and insurance programs (Robinson 2001, 26; Armendáriz and
Morduch 2010, 4; Ledgerwood and White 2006, xxx).
It is important to note once again that we lack sufficient empirical study to draw strongly
generalizable conclusions on the net effects of microcredit. Nonetheless, it seems that most
recent studies find far more mixed effects than past work. I take the side of the conventional
microfinance wisdom and hypothesize that microcredit will have a positive impact on the lives of
Guatemalans, but recognize the strong possibility as outlined in the recent literature that the
relationship will not be as I have hypothesized.
I also draw the idea from the general economic literature that bringing more participants
into high-skill formal jobs leads to macro-level economic development, focusing on high growth
rates of gross domestic product (Cohn 2005, 426). This development, or integration into the
market-based, liberal, internationally interconnected and mostly privatized formal economy, is
marked by a number of changes. The process of industrialization, a first step on the road to
development, sees a mass migration of rural dwellers to urban areas in search of manufacturing
and service-sector jobs. As the economy develops, more and more education is needed to be
involved in the most current jobs, and the birth rate drops as people pursue jobs over children; a
career in a “professional” or high-skill job requires this education and childbirth delay, and
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marks involvement in the market economy. Integration of more and more people into high-skill
jobs in the formal economy leads to increased economic development (Frankel 2010; Dollar
2010; Sally 2010). These processes normally occur due to macro-level phenomena. However, if
microcredit can encourage children to take high-skill jobs and delay childbirth, perhaps over time
it could become a variable that shapes a country’s development prospects. Again, I do not
attempt to test whether microcredit has society-level effects. I am simply noting that integrating
more people into high-skill, formal-sector jobs is always a good thing for development prospects,
and parent involvement in microcredit might have that effect on the second generation.

2.2

Women’s empowerment literature
Another main body of microfinance scholarship centers on women’s empowerment.

These scholars posit that women are traditionally excluded from the economic sector and can
become active in it through microfinance, gaining empowerment and personal income (Bayuglen
2008, 531). One major part of this literature focuses on household decision-making. Many posit
that women have different spending preferences than men, and are more likely to invest in their
household and their children (Blumberg 1989). Women are believed to put their new earnings
especially toward their children’s health and education, while men are believed to be more likely
to spend income on themselves, especially on gambling or other vices (Skoufias 2001). This can
be seen in lowered incidence of infectious diseases, increased household nutrient intake, and
normal height-for-age and weight-for-height of children when women generate their own income
through microcredit (Thomas 1990; Thomas 1994). School enrollment should also improve
(Skoufias 2001). In 1998 Khandker and Pitt published what is probably the most influential
study addressing the household expenditure preferences question. The most well known finding
showed that, of a loan of 100 taka, men spent 11 taka in the home, while women spent 18
15

(Khandker and Pitt 1998). However, research on this question has expanded since the 1990s, and
the hypothesis is no longer uniformly supported in the literature. Some scholars point out that
women may be more likely to funnel resources to their male children, since those children will
be the breadwinners (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 221). In addition, when women become
involved in microcredit-funded enterprises, they may pull their daughters from school to help
(Mayoux and Johnson 1997). Others simply argue that the data do not confirm any relationship
between gender and income allocation within the household (Roodman and Morduch 2009).
The gender-related literature also contains contending ideas concerning the impact of
microcredit on fertility. One line of thought argues that women involved in microfinance will
have fewer children, for a number of reasons (Rahman and Da Vanzo 1998; Schuler, Hashemi,
Riley 1997; Schultz 1990). Perhaps the opportunity cost of the newly self-employed woman’s
time increases, and she prefers to spend her time making money rather than having children.
There may also be some effect caused by peer pressure when the loan is group-based, whereby
the woman is urged to invest her earnings in the health and education of her existing children –
or, into the lending group itself. However, the impact of microfinance on fertility might be quite
the opposite. It could be that, as the income of female microloan recipients rises, their demand
for children may rise as well (Pitt, Khandker, McKernan et al. 1999). In some cases where
women have stable employment their fertility actually increases, since they feel financially
secure and able to provide for more children (Adserá 2004, 38). Although I do not pursue this
question in the first generation, I do investigate the fertility rates of borrowers’ children, and the
same general arguments apply.
The effect of education rates on fertility is better understood. Many scholars agree that
education increases the age at which a woman is likely to get married, therefore increasing her
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age at first pregnancy and decreasing the total number of children she bears (Weinberger 1987,
35). Extended years of education occupy women during their normal early childbearing years;
women want this education because it significantly increases the amount of money they are
destined to earn (Adserá 2004, 38). In other words, a college education means a college-level
job. The monetary return for a college-level job versus a secondary-education job is sufficiently
larger that women will choose to postpone having children during college, and as they establish
their career, so they can work at a higher wage level throughout their lives (Bratti 2003, 543).
Therefore, if microcredit leads to higher levels of education, it stands to reason that it should also
lead to later age at first birth and lower number of total children.

2.3

Social psychology literature
Outside of microfinance, the social psychology literature on self-efficacy, particularly

concerning entrepreneurial and economic self-efficacy, plays a major role in my argument. Selfefficacy is “an individual’s personal belief in his or her own capacity to accomplish a given
action” (Grabowski et al. 2001, 164). Self-efficacy has motivational and cognitive aspects. Part
of a person’s level of self-efficacy is their motivation to be in control and how much they
exercise it (Gecas 1989, 293). Another part is their more cognitive evaluation of how much
control they think they and other people have (Gecas 1989, 293). The idea that a person can feel
that her personal action can have an impact has been applied in politics, sociology, and business
in various ways (Bayuglen 2008; Grabowski et al. 2001; Luthans and Ibrayeva 2006; Madsen
1987). The application most important to my study is the “entrepreneurial self-efficacy” of
Luthans and Ibrayeva (2006). They theorize that the “personal characteristics” or the level of
self-efficacy of entrepreneurs combined with the “environmental context” yields their personal
entrepreneurial self-efficacies (Luthans and Ibrayeva 2006, 95). This entrepreneurial self17

efficacy can be defined as “entrepreneur’s beliefs and confidence in their capabilities to affect
their environment and become successful by their behaviors” (Luthans and Ibrayeva 2006, 96).
The emphasis is on both a feeling that personal action can bring success, and that the
environment is conducive to that success. Therefore, when people with this sense of efficacy are
given economic opportunities, they are likely to be more successful than others without the
driving sense of entrepreneurship. In addition, finding ways to build this self-efficacy in
developing economies would be beneficial for economic growth. Since they are so closely
related, in this paper I use the terms “economic self-efficacy,” “entrepreneurial self-efficacy” and
“entrepreneurship” interchangeably.
I draw on this literature to argue that microcredit can be one method of building
entrepreneurial self-efficacy. Microcredit puts the economic well-being of borrowers into their
own hands. Once they begin to actually benefit materially, their sense of economic self-efficacy
grows, since they see that personal effort can actually have a positive effect. They come to view
personal control as viable, and the economic environment as conducive to the exercise of
personal control. This especially relates to their feelings toward the formal economy; before
involvement with microfinance, they may have felt a sense of fatalism or distrust of the formal
economy, but after involvement, they come to see the greater economic environment as
favorable and worth being involved in. This sense of economic self-efficacy will be passed on to
their children, whom they will encourage to become more fully integrated members of the formal
economy.
Other than group-lending, gender-oriented and economic theories, few attempts have
been made to create a generalized concept of why and how microfinance impacts lives. Perhaps
this is because the relevant empirical basis for such a theory is lacking – if we are not sure of the
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social impacts of microcredit, how could we build a theory explaining them? Still, the
scholarship presented here provides support for each of my claims concerning the social effects
of microcredit.

2.4

Argument and hypotheses
I argue that microcredit has three main effects on the borrower: economic gain, an

increased personal sense of economic self-efficacy, and increased involvement in the formal
economy. These changes affect the children of borrowers in a number of ways. First, economic
gain leads to healthier children, better-educated children, and improves the probability that
children will delay their own childbirth and have fewer children. Increased economic selfefficacy coupled with involvement in the formal economy makes parents trust the formal
economy to bring prosperity, and therefore push their children to become involved in the formal
economy themselves. Parents value their children’s education because they know their children
need to go to school in order to harness their potential as actors in the formal economy.
Consequently the children of borrowers will be more likely to take high-skill jobs in the formal
economy. These effects should be stronger when the borrower is a woman, since women should
be more likely to invest in their children than men.
I derive a number of hypotheses from this argument. The first set of hypotheses concern
the material benefits gained from microcredit and its second-generation effects. The results of
these analyses can be found in Chapter 4, Section 1. First, involvement in microcredit should
lead to increased personal economic well-being. I draw this hypothesis from the (albeit mixed)
impact analyses in the economics-based literature. This hypothesis compares the first-generation
borrowers and non-borrowers, and also looks within the sample of loan recipients.
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H1: Involvement in microcredit leads to increased individual economic well-being.
The next hypotheses consider the possible results on children of increased well-being
achieved through microcredit. They center on how the children of loan recipients compare to
non-recipients. I posit that economic gain leads to healthier, better-educated children; these ideas
are drawn from both the impact-analysis and the gender-focused microfinance literature,
especially that concerning household expenditures. I would like to note that I do not think the
factors affecting second-generation education are constrained to the simple material benefits of
microcredit; as I argue, due to a change in values brought about by involvement in microcredit,
borrowing parents are more likely to encourage their children to take jobs in the formal
economy, and therefore are more likely to ensure that their children get the education they need
to succeed in those jobs.
One more hypothesis fits into this section. As shown in gender-related development
scholarship, when education levels increase on a macro level, birth rates tend to decline. Also,
macro-level economic development usually leads to a decline in birth rates. I apply these ideas to
the micro level: if individual economic circumstances improve for a child when her parent
becomes involved in microcredit, and if her education also raises as a result, then she is likely to
have fewer children at a later age. Like the education hypothesis, the birthrate hypothesis is also
related to my argument that a value change occurs in loan recipients. As the children of loan
recipients are taught to strive for a job in the formal economy, they will be more likely to delay
childbirth in order to pursue that type of career.
H2: The children of microcredit recipients suffer from fewer preventable childhood
diseases and have higher immunization rates than those of non-recipients.
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H3: The children of microcredit recipients attend more years of schooling than those of
non-recipients. They are also more likely to attend university.
H4: The children of microcredit recipients have fewer children and at a later age than
those of non-recipients.
The second set of hypotheses concern concepts that are more difficult to measure. The
results of the analyses conducted around these hypotheses can be found in Chapter 4, Section 2.
According to the microcredit literature based in economics, most loan recipients interact with the
formal economy for the first time when they receive a microloan. Hence becoming a borrower
leads to increased involvement in the formal economy.
H5: Involvement in microcredit brings the borrower into increased contact with the formal
economy.
Now the impact on borrowers becomes a bit more complex. In concert with the economic
literature claiming that microcredit leads to personal financial benefit and is the first interaction
of most borrowers with the formal economy, and the social psychology literature on economic
self-efficacy, I hypothesize that increased involvement in the formal economy coupled with the
personal financial benefits of microcredit leads to an increase in economic self-efficacy.
H6: Involvement in microcredit leads to a greater sense of economic self-efficacy.
I have attempted to test this hypothesis to find whether microcredit actually increases the
entrepreneurship of the borrower, but it is difficult to accurately determine whether borrowers
feel more economic self-efficacy before or after loans. It is important to note that it is possible
that entrepreneurial people self-select into microfinance programs; that is to say, some people
may naturally have a stronger sense of economic self-efficacy and therefore choose to become
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involved in microfinance (Khandker and Pitt 1998). If this is true, microcredit involvement does
not have a causal impact on self-efficacy. However, the force behind all of the effects, if they are
present, is still the recipient’s entrepreneurial drive facilitated by microcredit. Without that
opportunity, the borrower might or might not have found another one. I do not intend to argue
that microcredit is the only path to increased self-efficacy, nor to economic well-being. In the
end, I argue that the entrepreneurial spirit of the person is the causal force resulting in the
changes I am positing, and that involvement in microcredit is one manner of creating and
facilitating that spirit.
In essence I argue that microcredit eases borrowers into the formal economy, building an
entrepreneurial sense of economic self-efficacy that they pass on to their children. Borrowers
themselves probably remain in the informal sector, but their children grow up healthy and
educated, and adopt their parent’s self-efficacy. This means that the children of microloan
recipients are more likely to be able to take a spot in the formal economy, and more motivated to
do so. It is likely, then, that children of loan recipients will have jobs in the formal sector, and be
particularly likely to take high-skill ones.
H7: The children of microcredit recipients are more likely to work in high-skill, formal
sector jobs than those of non-recipients.
My final hypothesis concerns the interaction of gender with this process, and draws on
the literature concerning women’s empowerment. It is widely known that women receive
microcredit at significantly higher rates than men. A number of scholars have posited that
women are more likely to invest their earnings back into the household, resulting in better health
and education for their children. Other scholars have countered with empirical results that show
no relationship between the at-home investments of mothers versus fathers. If my hypothesis that
22

the children of female borrowers do benefit more is substantiated, it would be valid support for
the existing policies of many microcreditors that favor and recruit women, and give an incentive
to further draw women into microcredit in the future. Seeing as the relationship here remains a
point of contention, the results of this portion of my study will contribute to another relevant and
current gap in the literature.

H9: The children of female microloan recipients are more likely than the children of male
recipients to exhibit the positive characteristics in the previous hypotheses.
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Chapter 3: Research Design
To test these hypotheses I conducted original survey research in Guatemala during the
first two weeks of January 2011. I gathered 97 survey responses, a large enough sample to
facilitate quantitative analysis of the data. The survey, included here as Appendix 2, asks general
questions concerning the loan recipients’ personal histories and the educational, child-rearing
and career paths of their children. It also asks questions centered on more abstract topics,
intended to ascertain whether loan recipients have a higher sense of economic self-efficacy than
non-borrowers, and whether the borrower feels that receiving microcredit has increased her
personal material well-being.
Although I consider my study a kind of rough impact analysis, due to numerous time,
resource and situation constraints I was not able to fulfill the conditions of a typical impact
analysis. Most importantly, I was not able to establish a baseline before the beginning of the
microcredit program, nor was I able to set control and treatment groups. Therefore I use a nonexperimental research design, and consider my work a plausibility probe to determine whether it
is worthwhile to expend significant time and resources conducting a broader, more extensive
survey. Since my exploratory effort yielded some significant results, I believe that further inquiry
into the subject is warranted, and I hope to extend the study to more of Latin America in future
research.

3.1

Study Design
Given the paucity of impact analyses of microcredit programs, there is very little data to

be analyzed on the subject. Hence I chose to gather my own data to investigate questions of the
first and second-generation impacts of microcredit. Study is especially lacking in Central
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America, as most tends to center on South Asia. Guatemala is a suitable laboratory for this
research because enough years with microcredit have passed that second-generation effects can
be investigated. I coordinated with the largest microlender in the country, Fundación Génesis
Empresarial, which loaned around 554 million US dollars to some 275,379 borrowers by May of
2010. The foundation has been active in the country for 23 years, a suitable length of time for
second-generation effects to be visible. The foundation is also a good candidate for study since it
is a non-profit and has a stated goal of raising people from poverty, as opposed to bank-run
microcredit programs that are more interested in profit generation.
Most impact analyses are conducted using some combination of closed-answer survey
format and open-ended interviewing, so I adopted this format in my own study. Most of my
actual hypothesis testing involves analysis of the quantitative data gathered in the closed-answer
portion, but I include vignettes from the more open questions as illustrative material for my
conclusions. I focus on quantitative testing because I want my results to be as generalizable as
possible. With the time and resources I had available I would have only been able to conduct one
case study, whereas I was able to survey three separate areas using a quantitative survey design.
In addition, my research design is more easily replicable than a qualitative one, and I want to
ensure that my results are verifiable.
Impact analyses tend to focus on a range of units of analysis, but when investigating
material, social and personal changes the typical unit of analysis is the “client as an individual”
(Ledgerwood 1999, 57). This is opposed to approaching the “client as a client” in order to get his
or her opinion of the services received, or to considering the enterprise as the unit of study in
order to compare its profitability and prospects to those of other institutions (Ledgerwood 1999,
57). Consequently the unit of analysis in this study is the individual client, or in my case what
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can also be known as the “intrahousehold” level, since I investigate the effects of microcredit on
all people in the respondent’s home (Ledgerwood 1999, 57). Some of the most common impacts
analyzed on the household and individual level with quantitative methods are income, asset
accumulation, child health and child education, all of which I explore in this study.
While conducting rigorous impact analyses is essential to truly understanding the effects
of microcredit programs, they have not been widely undertaken. This lack of research can be
attributed to the high resource costs associated with conducting them, both of time and money,
and the difficulty of doing so accurately (Ledgerwood 1999, 49). Most impact analyses have one
major goal: to show the impact of receiving the intervention in question on client income
(Ledgerwood 1999, 51). However, it is very difficult to be certain that an individual’s change in
income is really due to receiving microcredit, a problem known as the “attribution dilemma”
(Ledgerwood 1999, 51). The best way to attempt to overcome this dilemma is a careful
experimental research design. Two groups of individuals are randomly selected: the “treatment”
group, which receives the intervention, and the “control” group, which does not (Ledgerwood
1999, 55). Randomly selecting participants ensures that the two groups are mostly similar in
every way except for involvement in the treatment, meaning that any change in outcome that is
different between the groups should be due to the intervention. Usually this type of study begins
before the intervention so that a baseline may be established, then continued over time
(Ledgerwood 1999, 52).
In sum, my study would have to cover a lengthy time horizon and involve randomly
selected control and active groups in order to ascertain whether or not borrowers are better off
materially than they would have been in the absence of microloans (Armendáriz and Morduch
2010, 270). Unfortunately my study falls short of these parameters. As the literature points out,
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creating control and treatment groups requires explicit coordination with the microcredit
institution under study and a substantial time and resource commitment. I could not establish
these groups nor randomly select a sample, so I had to use one of convenience. Therefore I
employ a quasi-experimental research design. My single cross section is a quick and cheap way
to get data, as required by the limited resources for this study, but the short time horizon
complicates my ability to attribute changes to microcredit.
This research is not without merit, however. Although I am not able to ascertain what the
respondent’s standard of living would have been in the absence of microcredit, I can compare his
or her current state to that of the non-borrowers in the sample. This provides a resource-efficient
exploratory method of comparing the situations of loan recipients to non-recipients, especially
when coupled with a number of control variables that make the results more reliable. Given that
even these crude measures are often significant in my study, there is sufficient justification for
more nuanced study of the questions pursued here.

3.2

Survey and Sample
The survey administered to respondents is included as Appendix 2. It is divided into four

sections. The first section asks general questions of respondents, seeking to determine whether
loan recipients feel that their economic situation is better than that of non-borrowers (H1),
whether their sense of economic self-efficacy is higher (H6), and whether they are more or less
involved in the formal economy (H5). Only recipients of microloans completed the second
section. It asks a number of questions about the loans received by the participant, what they are
being used for, and what kind of work the recipient did before becoming involved in
microfinance. Questions also attempt to decipher whether the recipient is better off materially
after receiving microcredit (H1). The next section of the survey addresses my hypotheses
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focused on the children of recipients. I ask whether each child suffered from a serious disease
(H2), how many years of school they completed including years of university and why they left
school early if they did (H3), how many grandchildren the recipient has and at what age their
children began having children (H4), and what kind of job each child works in (H7). The survey
ends with a battery of basic demographic questions. This section asks the sex of the subject so
that I may test whether second-generation effects are stronger when the recipient is a woman
(H8).
I include more than one question aimed at each hypothesis so that I have multiple ways to
test them. I used the AmericasBarometer survey for Guatemala by the Latin American Public
Opinion Project as the wording base for many of the questions, and these questions were
extensively pre-tested. However, I was unable to pre-test my own questions, so there is a
possibility that some bias entered the data through imprecise question wording. I only have cause
to believe that this occurred for one question, number 5 in Section 1 of the survey, corresponding
to the variable control. I was surprised that nearly all respondents felt that they are very much in
control of the future and success of their business. It is possible that some interpreted my use of
the word “control” as a kind of accounting control; in other words, they felt that I was asking if
they had the more basic secretarial aspects of their business under control. However, a few
respondents immediately recognized the intent of the question and named things that are out of
their control. The question is probably imperfectly worded, then, but the bias should not be too
severe. All of the surveys were completely anonymous.
I administered the surveys with the help of Fundación Génesis Empresarial (FGE). This
institution is the largest dedicated expressly to microlending in Guatemala, and also a non-profit
with the goal of promoting “the socioeconomic development of the owners of microbusinesses”
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in order to “accelerate the progress of Guatemala” (Fundación Génesis Empresarial 2007). In
Guatemala most providers of small loans are banks, some with a focus on rural and small
business development, but still financial institutions offering a broad spectrum of services. FGE
is one of only a few institutions expressly dedicated to providing small loans at low interest. It is
therefore somewhat atypical among microlenders in Guatemala. It is suitable for study, though,
since most research on microcredit focuses on institutions like FGE that were created specifically
as microfinance providers.
FGE gives home and business loans from their offices across the country. Business loans
range from small loans given to “communal banks,” also known as group lending, to larger loans
given to individuals known as “loans for microbusinesses,” to the largest loans for established
businesses called “loans for small businesses” (FGE 2007). Home loans are given to individuals
who can prove that their living conditions are poor, that they are unable to fix those conditions
without the loan, but that they are still capable of repaying it. They are often used for repairing
existing homes or adding another room, but are sometimes taken to construct new homes,
typically made of cement blocks.
The company’s central office is in Guatemala City, with regional offices called
sucursales throughout the country. Each sucursal has a boss and a team of asesores, employees
who make contacts with potential clients, evaluate whether they are suitable, and then monitor
them and collect their payments. These asesores are selected from within the communities that
they monitor, ensuring that they have trust built up in the community as well as prior knowledge
of probable applicants. Management sees this vetting process as integral to assuring the success
of the institution, since they try to only give loans to reliable clients. Ensuring that a client is
reliable entails casually interviewing members of the community to make sure that the potential
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recipient and their spouse do not drink and are responsible. Therefore there is some selection bias
inherent in the sample of loan recipients; most people who successfully receive loans are
possibly less likely than others to spend their money on alcohol and more likely to work hard
investing the funds into their businesses.
I contacted Génesis by e-mail and phone and explained the goals of my project. The
administration in the central office agreed to facilitate the research by giving me access to their
clients, and also by helping me interview non-borrowers in the same communities. Their
cooperation came with two requirements: that I must share my findings when the study is
finished, and that a representative from the foundation had to accompany me at every interview.
The second stipulation obviously has some implications for my data. It is possible that the
presence of a member of the foundation biased my survey results. However, the presence of an
asesor was also indispensable. Due to Guatemala’s violent political history and present, most
citizens are naturally suspicious of interviews. I would have been able to collect far less
information without a sponsoring organization with as much goodwill in the community as
Génesis. At any rate, the bias in the data is mitigated because the representative typically did not
stay for the full interview. The interaction began by introducing me to the respondent and
explaining to him or her that I was conducting a study for my thesis research. Then the asesor
asked if the person would like to be interviewed since participation was completely voluntary. If
the interviewee was a client, the asesores stressed that the responses were anonymous and would
have no impact on funding opportunities, then left the room or the interview area. In most cases
the respondents appeared to be giving quite honest information. Many prefaced statements by
saying that they probably should not say something, but that they could not help but be honest,
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and continued on openly with the opinion. In fact, quite a few said negative things about the
organization while the asesor was still in the room.
Each day I was assigned to one or two asesores in the office I was working in, and they
took me to see a number of their clients. Some asesores made appointments with their clients by
calling them via cellular telephone. Every person who I interviewed, loan recipient or not, owned
a cell phone, so contacting interviewees in this manner did not bias the sample. Other asesores
simply took me to see their clients without giving them prior warning. Interviews were
conducted either in the respondent’s home or place of work. I interviewed the main loan
recipient, but the spouse or children of the respondent were also present at times and answered
questions as well, which I notated on the surveys but did not use in the quantitative analysis.
Most of the interviews took between 15 and 30 minutes, depending on the number of children of
the respondent and the setting. In busy businesses the interviews often took longer, as I let the
respondent attend each customer and asked questions in between.
I worked in three sucursales in Western Guatemala, based in the cities of
Quetzaltenango, Huehuetenango and San Marcos. I was originally scheduled to work in Eastern
Guatemala, where Génesis has been active for the longest amount of time. This would have
yielded a longer time period for the effects of receiving microcredit to disseminate to the
children of recipients. Two weeks before my trip, however, the government declared a state of
siege in the states I had planned to work in due to the escalating drug violence in those areas.
FGE graciously moved my itinerary to the safer western portion of the country, but unfortunately
those offices have not been active for as long as their eastern counterparts. I would like to have
had wider geographical variation as well, but the organization suggested that due to limited time
it would be much more efficient to focus in one area, allowing me to gather substantially more
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surveys. I chose observations over geographical variation, which perhaps enters some bias into
the data, but given the exploratory nature of this study and the more or less similar composition
of the Guatemalan population across regions I did not think the possibility of bias from
geographical concentration too severe. The only major change between regions involves which
indigenous ethnicity is most prevalent, and the socioeconomic differences between mestizos and
indigenous people are much larger than those between different indigenous groups.
The sucursales I visited are illustrated below in Figure 3.1. Each state is named after its
capital city, and it is in these capital cities that the sucursales are based. I worked in
Huehuetenango for the first three and a half days, finishing there with 35 interviews. I spent the
next three days working in the San Marcos office. I gathered 33 interviews there. Finally, I ended
in the Quetzaltenango office, where I got 29 surveys in my last two and a half days.
My sample of loan recipients and non-borrowers is more or less one of convenience. This
is not a random sample since I am only working with one microfinance organization, and
because it does not account for clients who may have received loans and dropped out due to lack
of success or because they were so successful they moved on to larger bank loans. I would need
to find every person who has ever received a microloan, and their children, to have a truly
random sample. However, while surveying non-clients I encountered quite a few people who
received loans from sources other than FGE, making my sample somewhat more representative
of the population of Guatemalan microloan recipients. In addition, asesores usually took me to
people they knew personally to gather the non-borrower surveys. This is certainly not a random
process of selection, but I do not think it entails serious bias since the asesores tended to take me
to a wide socioeconomic range of non-borrowers. My study is generally biased, unfortunately,
against non-borrowers. Since it was easier to track down clients, and even among non-clients
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many Guatemalans had received microloans, 68 of my sample of 97 had received some kind of
loan, while only 29 respondents had never received a loan.

!

Figure 3.1: Sucursales in Guatemala. Circles indicate cities where I worked.

The total number of observations for tests concerning first-generation effects is fairly low
at 97, especially when some observations drop due to missing data. Logistical regression
analyses need around 100 observations to function, so I am hovering at the bottom end of the
sufficient number of observations for this test. On the other hand, the interviews with the 97
respondents yielded a sample of 306 children. This is a more suitable number of observations for
running regression analyses, although an N of over 500 yields the most reliable results (Long and
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Freese 2006, 77). When a few specific dependent variables are used in the child dataset, like the
measure of adult children’s education, the N falls substantially, so the number of observations
depends significantly on the dependent variable in use.
I tried to stress to each sucursal that I needed to see a cross-section of clients, not just the
successful ones, but it would be hard for me to prove that I did survey a representative sample in
that respect. Consequently it is possible that my results are biased somewhat in favor of
successful recipients. Yet this bias is probably mild, since many respondents reported that their
gains from microcredit were small or non-existent. I also asked to interview clients with different
amounts of experience with microcredit, and my sample does seem to have good variation on
this variable, ranging from clients with one month of time working with microcredit to 16 years.
The sample of men versus women is quite reflective of the actual population of loan recipients;
of the 68 borrowers in my sample, 51 or 75% are women, and 17 or 25% are men. In the actual
population of recipients, 70% are women (Personal Communication: Evelyn Di Chiara, e-mail,
November 10, 2011). Of 29 non-borrowers, 10 are men and 19 are women.
Around 88% of FGE’s borrowers are in rural areas; however, due to the time and
difficulty involved in reaching this population, my sample of loan recipients is only 64% rural
and 36% urban. Among non-loan recipients, 41% of my sample lives in rural areas and 59% in
urban ones. In 2010 about 49% of the population was living in urban areas, so urban dwellers are
over-represented in my sample (CIA 2011). When looking at the data for the individual states I
surveyed, the differences are smaller. According to 2002 census data, 77% of the population of
Huehuetenango lives in rural areas (INE 2002). This is very similar to my sample: out of 24
respondents in the state of Huehuetenango, 27 or 79% live in rural areas. The numbers for
Quetzaltenango are also closely mirrored by my sample. In 2002 55% of the population lived in
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urban areas, and 54% of my sample in the region (15 of 28) are urban dwellers (INE 2002). The
only sample of the three that is actually skewed to favor urban dwellers is that of San Marcos. Of
34 respondents, 19 or 54% live in the city, while only 22% of the total population actually lives
in urban locales.
Indigenous people are more or less correctly represented in the recipient sample.
According to a UN-Habitat study, 55% of the Guatemalan population belongs to one of the
indigenous ethnic groups, while 45% are mestizo and Spanish-only speakers (Valladares Cerezo
2003). In my sample, a similar 51% of loan recipients are indigenous, and 49% ladino. Among
non-borrowers indigenous people are over-represented, since 65% of respondents are indigenous
and 35% are mestizo.
Finally, my sample is roughly representative in terms of loan kinds. 18% of Génesis
clients take home loans, nearly identical to the 19% of my sample receiving home loans (FGE
2007). 7% of my respondents are receiving the largest type of loans, small business loans,
slightly larger than the 5% of the population doing so. 35% of my sample are taking group loans
as opposed to 49% of clients, and 38% are taking individual small loans in comparison to 28% of
the loan-receiving population. I only surveyed small business owners, except for two recipients
of home loans who are employees in a business that is not family owned. I limited the sample in
this way because I thought that a non-recipient of loans who does not own her own business
could not be comparable to a microbusiness loan recipient. However, since I do not sample
employees I cannot know if there are important differences between business owners and
employees, nor can I explore the mechanisms by which employees become business owners or
take microloans.
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3.3

Variables and Quantitative Methods of Analysis
The survey responses provide the information encoded in the 45 unique variables I used

in this study, presented in the Appendix: Respondent Codebook and Children Codebook
sections. Variables can be thought of as belonging to one of three groups: independent,
dependent or control. I prepare the quantitative analyses around the dependent variables, each
model including one of three independent variables, plus controls suitable to the situation.
All of the main independent variables are different ways of measuring how much
involvement the respondent has had with microcredit. When investigating the impact of
microcredit on the borrowers themselves, the independent variable records whether the person
has taken loans. For the hypotheses concerning the impact on children, the independent variable
focuses on the amount of time that the child has been exposed to microloans through his or her
parent. In both the child and recipient datasets I constructed three independent variables. The
first is a simple dichotomous measure, yesornoloan, which records whether the respondent has
ever received a loan (Variables 24 and 45). Hence the variable tells whether that child’s parent
has ever received any kind of microloan. This is the crudest independent variable, since it does
not reflect the amount of time the person has been receiving the loan, nor what kind it is.
Next I created the ratio-level pctageloan variable (Variables 16 and 41). This measure
records the percentage of the respondent’s age during which he or she has received microloans.
In the survey I asked how many years ago each loan was taken. I selected the oldest loan then
divided that number of years by the age of the respondent to get this variable. For children, I first
figured out each child’s age when the parent began receiving loans by subtracting the number of
years the parent has been receiving the oldest loan from the child’s age. If the parent began
receiving loans before the child was born, I record the child’s age at first loan as 0. I subtracted
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the age at first loan from the child’s current age, yielding the number of years the child has been
alive while her parent received microloans. Then I divided that number of years by the child’s
current age, yielding the percentage of her age that her parent has been receiving loans. This
variable is more nuanced than the first, then, because it can account for difference in effects over
time. I also created another variable, pctchildhoodloan, that is computed in the same way but
only considers time receiving loans while the child was under the age of 18, or living in the
home without a full-time outside job. When I ran the analyses with this variable the results were
almost identical to those of pctageloan, so I only report the results for the latter in the results
section.
My final independent variable, yesnobusn, is dichotomous (Variables 23 and 44). It is
coded 1 if the respondent has received a business loan, and 0 if the respondent has only received
home loans or has never received any loan. This variable has the benefit of shedding light on
whether business loans are particularly likely to create any effects.
I include a standard battery of control variables in each model, as well as controls specific
to each hypothesis. Controls must be included to ensure that the data are comparable. If I did not
control for the urban or rural home of the respondent, for instance, I could not be sure that
variation in outcomes was caused by involvement in microlending, since differences between the
two areas could be causing the variation in results instead. The standard controls I use in every
model include age, female, urbanrural and indigenous. Age (Variables 1 and 30) records the age
in years of the respondent or the respondent’s child, depending on the dataset. Female (variables
7 and 41) codes the respondent or child as 0 if male or 1 if female, and indigenous records the
respondent or child as 0 if mestizo or 1 if indigenous (Variables 9 and 37). Urbanrural
(Variables 22 and 43) describes the area in which the respondent or his child lives. It is coded 0
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if a rural area, 1 if semi-urban, or 2 if urban. I made this measure simply by looking around the
area of the interview if it was conducted in the respondent’s home or in the same area as their
home. I considered an area rural if houses were quite spread out and services like stores and gas
stations were difficult to access. I coded an area as semi-urban if it was a small town separate
from an urban conglomeration, or if it was a sparsely populated area somewhat near a large city.
I counted an area as urban if it was within a city or suburb. If the interview was conducted away
from the person’s home I asked where he or she lived, then consulted the asesor as to what kind
of location it was. This is an effective method since the asesores are from the communities they
work in, and are accordingly very familiar with them.
Most models include some variables to control for level of education. On the respondent
level, this variable (4) is called educ. It records the last level completed by the interviewee,
ranging from no formal schooling, some years of or completed primary school, some years of or
completed middle school (básicos), some years of or completed secondary education, to some
years of or completed university. When the child’s level of education is important, two variables
can be used: complete or adulteduc. These variables are also used as dependent variables in the
tests of the education hypotheses. In other models they control for the level of education of the
child. Complete (Variable 33) is coded as 0 if the child has not completed the appropriate amount
of school for his age, and 1 if he has. Adulteduc (Variable 26) focuses only on the adult children
of respondents and uses the same scale as the educ variable. Finally, when the model needs to
account for the level of education of the child’s parent who responded to the survey, parenteduc
is included. It is the exact same variable as educ, except that it is included in the child dataset.
A few other control variables were only sporadically significant. For instance, I asked
respondents if they received remittances, and if so, to what point the family income depends on
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that money. Of the 97 respondents, only 12 reported that they receive remittances, although most
people knew someone working outside of the country and many said that they received
remittances in the past (for example, Respondent 59). Of the 12, 9 said that they depend on the
remittances very little. Most said that they were more like gifts at special times of the year than
actual income (Respondent 17). Only three reported that they depend heavily on the remittances.
I made the variable remitt with this information, coding reliance on remittances from a scale of 1
to 4 (Variable 18). Remitt was only significant in one test, which is discussed in the analysis
section, but otherwise I do not include its insignificant results. The same is true for aveloanamt, a
variable (2) that records the average loan amount for each respondent. For interviewees who
have never received a loan their value for this variable is 0. For all others I add up the amount of
each loan received in quetzals and take the average, which becomes the respondent’s value for
this variable. I sometimes included aveloanamt as an alternative independent variable, but since
it was not often significant I discuss it only once in the results section.
A number of other controls were included in the various models. They were neither
significant nor substantially increased the models’ r-squared values, so I have not included them
in the discussions and tables in the results section. In the literature review I discussed the body of
work on microfinance that focuses on the group lending mechanism. According to early
scholarship in this area, group lending should be more effective than individual loans. In line
with more recent studies, though, the variable that controls for whether the recipient’s loan was
given individually or through a group was always insignificant. I asked each borrower how they
receive their loans, and then coded the variable 2 if individual, 3 if in a duo and 4 if through a
group. Respondents who have never received a loan were coded as 1. I could not run this control
in the same models as my typical independent variables, since the data are collinear. I did run
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indivgroup (Variable 10) as the main independent variable on a number of the dependent
variables under investigation, and it was never significant. Two other controls never yielded
significant results: govmoney and parentloanyesno. The former (Variable 6) records whether the
respondent receives any kind of money through the government, either through retirement funds
or the Mi Familia Progresa conditional cash transfer program. The latter (Variable 15) measures
whether the respondent’s parent received microloans. Neither of these variables has a significant
impact on the social, material and personal effects in question. The CCT program is quite new,
so it is possible that its effects simply are not visible yet.
The final control variable of interest is the age at which a child was exposed to loans, or
the child’s age when his or her parent began taking microloans. This variable is theoretically
important, because we cannot expect a child to exhibit any effect due to exposure to microcredit
if the parent began borrowing when the child was already an adult. Unfortunately I was not able
to include the variable as a control when running tests on the full sample of respondents,
including both loan recipients and non-borrowers, since no age at first loan can be recorded for
children who have never been exposed to one and those observations are therefore coded as
missing data. In some cases, then, I may not be seeing a significant effect of microcredit because
I am not accounting for age at first loan and cannot be sure if the observation coded is pre- or
post-loan. I was able to include age as a control variable, and age is highly correlated with age at
first loan, with a correlation coefficient of .9094. Age at first loan was also included as a control
whenever I ran a test among children of loan recipients.
The dependent variables consist of a wide range of data and are discussed in more detail
in the results section. When the dependent variable is dichotomous I analyze the data using
logistic regression. For categorical dependent variables, for instance a ranking of how financially
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stable the respondent feels before and after microcredit, I analyze the data using ordered logistic
regression. Finally, for count-level data I use Poisson regression analysis, and for ratio level data
like the amount of money the respondent makes, I use Ordinary Least Squares regression. All of
these analyses are calculated with robust standard error terms. Since I typically use two or more
dependent variables to test each of the eight hypotheses, and each of those dependent variables
must be run separately with the three independent variables, I conducted around 60 separate
analyses.
Within the set of tests for each dependent variable, I ensure that the same observations
are being used in all three tests. Consequently the results of these tests can be compared. I do not
run all three independent variables in the same models. The variables record similar data in
different ways, so multicollinearity issues should result. In fact the correlation between any two
independent variables is notable but not extremely high: .6176 between yesornoloan and
pctageloan and .6529 between yesornoloan and yesnobusn. However, if pctageloan and
yesornoloan are run in separate models and are significant, when they are included in the same
model they tend to lose significance. One of the variables also tends to flip signs. There appears
to be some level of interrelatedness between them, then. The best way to reconcile these
problems would be to interact the two main independent variables in the same model. Due to the
time constraints of this study I was unable to conduct this analysis, so I ran each independent in a
separate model. No other variables were highly correlated. I treat all tests as two-tailed; since the
literature is mixed on most of these questions, I cannot assume that the sign of the coefficient
will point a particular way. Finally, in the tests involving the children of microcredit recipients, I
clustered the observations so that the children of each respondent are not considered independent
of each other but rather as the offspring of a common parent.
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Chapter 4: Analysis and Results
4.1

Hypotheses Concerning First and Second-Generation Material and Social Effects
When material well-being, integration into the formal economy and economic self-

efficacy all rise due to involvement in microcredit, I expect that the children of borrowers
become healthier, better educated, involved in high-skill careers in the formal economy, and
likely to have fewer children at a later age than the children of non-borrowers. The initial section
of my argument concerns the possible first-generation material benefits of engaging in
microcredit, and the potential effect of those gains on the second generation. Drawing from the
literature on microcredit, I argue that involvement in microcredit typically leads to increased
economic well-being for the individual (H1). If involvement in microcredit leads to increased
individual economic well-being, it stands to reason that those material benefits will accrue to the
children of the borrower as well. Therefore I hypothesize that the children of microcredit
borrowers will be less likely to suffer from serious childhood diseases and have higher
immunization rates (H2: Health) and be more likely to complete the government-mandatory
years of schooling as well as attend more years afterwards (H3: Education) than the children of
non-borrowers. In conjunction with the increased expression of economic self-efficacy discussed
in the next section, material gains by the parent should also lead children to have fewer children
of their own and at a later age than the offspring of non-borrowers (H4: Birth).

4.1.1. H1: Involvement in microcredit leads to increased economic well-being
I tested my first hypothesis in a number of ways. The first methods involve comparing
loan recipients to non-recipients, and the second set of tests look within the sample of recipients
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to compare their experiences. First I discuss the tests covering all responses, and in the following
section I discuss the analyses covering only the responses of loan recipients.

Tests of full dataset
In the full sample I ran a number of variations of two models. The first model used the
ordinal variable makingitcurr, ranking the respondent’s feeling about how he or she is currently
“making it” economically on a scale of 1 (not receiving enough family income to get by on) to 3
(receiving enough family income to get by on as well as save). In every test I used makingitcurr
as the dependent variable (Variable 12). To test the impact of receiving a loan on whether or not
the family income is enough to get by on, I used three independent variables. The first,
yesornoloan, is a simple binary variable (Variable 24). The next, pctageloan, represents the
percentage of the respondent’s age during which he or she has been receiving loans (Variable
16). Finally, the binary variable yesnobusn represents respondents who have received a business
loan, versus those who have never received a business loan in particular (Variable 23).
Table 4.1 presents the results of the ordered logistic regression analyses with
makingitcurr as the dependent variable. Model 1a uses yesornoloan as the main independent
variable, 1b uses pctageloan, and 1c uses yesnobusn. Six control variables are also included,
representing the respondent’s gender, age, ethnicity, level of education, urban or rural home, and
whether the respondent receives remittances.3 As Table 4.1 shows, all three of the main
independent variables (has or has not received a loan, percent of age receiving loan, and business
loans) are significant in their respective models. The model using age at receiving loan as the
independent variable is also significant, with very similar results all around. Of the control

3

Three other controls were included in various different models, but were never significant, so I have not included
them here: parentloanyesno, aveloanamt, and the govmoney dummies. Nor is aveloanamt significant when run as a
main independent variable.
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variables, education and remittances are significant in all four models, and age is significant in
two.
Since the analysis conducted in this model is ordered logistic regression, the coefficients
need special interpretation. I report the predicted probabilities of change in the dependent
variable in the column next to each model.4 If the respondent receives any kind of loan, the
probability that she will report that her family is making enough money to get by on as well as
save is 30% greater than a respondent who has not received a loan (min->max/0->1 = .3024).
This effect becomes stronger over time, as we can see in Model 1b with the percent of age
variable. As the percent of the recipient’s age involved in microcredit increases from its
minimum to maximum value, the respondent becomes 68% more likely to report that his family
has enough money to survive and save (min->max = .6760). Finally, if a respondent receives a
business loan, the probability that she will report that her family is making enough money to get
by on as well as save is 36% greater than for a respondent who does not receive business loans
(min->max = .3631). These predicted probabilities show that receiving a microloan, particularly
a business loan and any loan over a longer period of time, substantively and positively influence
the way respondents perceive their personal economic situations. According to the results of

4

Tables throughout this study list the discrete change in the predicted probabilities for a minimum to maximum
increase in the independent variable. In the text I discuss probabilities for other changes in the independent when
appropriate.
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Table 4.1
Ordered logistic regression on makingitcurr
Independent
Variables

Model 1a
(yesornoloan)

yesornoloan

1.943***
(.6078)

-.3451,
.0427, .3024

--

--

--

--

pctageloan

--

--

8.676***
(2.695)

-.2809,
-.3951, .6760

--

--

yesnobusn

--

--

--

--

1.886***
(.5125)

-.2523,
-.1109, .3631

female

-.0436
(.5221)

.0059, .0029,
-.0087

.1418
(.5185)

-.0195,
-.0082, .0277

-.5208
(.5448)

.0609, .0491,
-.1100

age

-.0314
(.0282)

.2316, .0412,
-.2728

-.0552**
(.0287)

.4319, .0079,
-.4397

-.0454
(.0290)

.3354, .0419,
-.3772

indigenous

.5722 (.4810)

-.0770,
-.0375, .1146

.3999
(.4855)

-.0535,
-.0262, .0797

.8020*
(.4897)

-.1021,
-.0591, .1612

remitt

.9152*
(.5402)

-.1759,
-.4158, .5917

1.088**
(.5529)

-.1858,
-.4713, .6571

1.072**
(.5528)

-.1748,
-.4756, .6504

educ

.1943*
(.1115)

-.1830,
-.1475, .3306

.1960*
(.1118)

-.1831,
-.1496, .3327

.2765**
(.1162)

-.2364,
-.2320, .4684

urbanrural

.2417 (.2965)

-.0668,
-.0549
-.0283, .0951 (.2764)

.0147, .0072,
-.0219

-.0587
(.2771)

.0150, .0086,
-.0236

!1

1.196 (1.553)

-.7289
(1.454)

-.2836
(1.499)

!2

3.809 (1.610)

1.904
(1.465)

2.401
(1.522)

Pseudo R2

.1679

.1710

.1912

LR chisquare

29.12***

29.66***

33.16***

82

82

82

number of
observation
s

Coefficient

Model 1b
(pctageloan)

Coefficient

Model 1c
(yesnobusn)

Coefficient

First entry is the unstandardized coefficient, followed by the standard error in parentheses.
***p!.01; **p!.05; *p!.10
Coeff = discrete change in the predicted probabilities for a minimum to maximum increase in the independent
variable. Computed using prchange command, looking at the min!max column. First coefficient listed for each
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independent variable represents coefficient when dependent = 1, second coefficient when dependent = 2, third
coefficient when dependent = 3.

models 1a through 1c in Table 4.1, then, statistically significant support exists for my hypothesis
that involvement in microcredit leads to increased economic well-being.5

Tests using only the responses of loan recipients
To further investigate the first hypothesis I looked at four variables within the set of loan
recipients. Makingitpre (Variable 13) asks the same question as makingitcurr, except that it
refers to the period before the respondent received the loan. Situation asks the respondent if she
feels that her current economic situation is worse (1), the same (2), a little better (3) or
substantially better (4) than before taking loans. Incomebuspct (Variable 8) is the percentage
change in income of the respondent’s business after receiving a loan. Finally, thingsploan is a
number between 1 and 5 that tells how many of the objects, described in the things variable, the
recipient currently owns but did not own before receiving a loan (Variable 21).6
First I compared makingitpre to makingitcurr, using a cross-tabulation with Pearson chisquare and Kendall’s tau-b statistics. This is an appropriate test because both are ordinal level

5

I tested the same hypothesis using the count-level things as the dependent variable in a series of Poisson regression
models. This variable asks the respondents how many of five items (television, cellular phone, refrigerator,
microwave, and computer) they currently have in their homes (Variable 20). Of 95 observations, 6 respondents own
only one of these things, 18 own two, 21 own three, 22 own 4 and 28 respondents have all five possessions. The
independent variables did not have a statistically significant effect on the number of things owned by the respondent.
Only one of the control variables influences the number of things a person owns: level of education. For every rung
in the educational ladder that the respondent climbs, her count of things will increase by about 6%. I pared down the
model, taking into account the small sample size, but none of the independent variables became significant. I found
similar results when looking within the sample of only loan recipients.
6 Income is a typical measure of whether receiving loans has had an impact, and often plays an important role in
some studies as a control. However, I was unable to get a measure of income that is meaningful in either of these
contexts. Since I interviewed small business owners, they can give a rough estimate of how much money the
business makes in a given time frame, but since they re-invest so much of their earnings into their businesses and do
not pay taxes on income, most respondents were unable to accurately estimate how much money they “make” or
keep in a month after accounting for business expenses. I was able to calculate percentage change in income after
receiving loans, which is meaningful, but raw income is not. Raw income is misleading, since some businesses
require more capital than others; it seems that these individuals are making more money than others, but in reality
they are simply providing a more expensive product that requires more capital investment from earnings.
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variables with the same number of categories (Pollock 2006, 123). Table 4.2 shows that only
four respondents feel that they are less able to make it on their family income compared to their
situation before taking a loan, whereas 29 feel that they have moved up by either one or two
steps. Another substantial portion, 20 loan recipients, feel that their ability to “make it” on the
family income is the same as before taking loans. However, neither the chi-square (2.784,
pr=5.95) nor the tau-b (-0.0296) value provides evidence to suggest that there is a significant
relationship between the two variables.
Table 4.2
makingitpre by makingitcurr
Family is not
making enough to
get by on

Family is making
just enough

Family is making
enough to get by
and to save

Total

Family was not
making enough to
get by on

2

10

10

22

40.00

38.46

45.45

41.51

Family was
making just
enough

2

15

9

26

40.00

57.69

40.91

49.06

Family was
making enough to
get by and to save

1

1

3

5

20.00

3.86

13.64

9.43

Total

5

26

22

53

100.00

100.00

100.00

Pearson chi-square

2.784

Kendall’s tau-b

-0.0296

N

53

***p!.001

The lack of significance is surprising, since most loan recipients talked about how their
loans had improved their lives outside of the structured questions. Some respondents were
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emphatic about praising the loan. Respondent 37 was so adamant that she said, “Génesis brought
us from poverty,” and I was so impressed by her enthusiasm that I noted next to the quote that
the asesor was not in the room. I saw that Respondent 52 “does a very brisk business!” in her
market stall selling basic food products. She said, “We lived poorly, my children were hungry.”
After receiving microloans she was able to start the store, and now after her eighth loan, “There
is always enough product to keep selling.” Respondent 58 said that her toy and gift store has
“grown quite a lot” because they have “some more resources” to invest in inventory. Respondent
76 says that “We are much better, we built a little new room and kitchen with our earnings.” She
attributes the change to the loan because “If you invest a little in your business, you know that
you will get back a little more.” Respondent 17 says the loan helped his business giving
computer classes because it “helps him get more clients.” According to Respondent 53, her loan
is the “fundamental base” of her successful store and various other enterprises that are
continually expanding. Home loan recipients feel similarly, because they see a tangible
difference due to the loan very quickly. Respondent 74 said, “Before, all four of us lived in this
one room. Now we have another room, a bathroom. Now it’s enough. We wouldn’t have been
able to save enough to do this – something always happens and you have to spend your savings.”
Not all respondents agree that the impact is so strong, of course. Many noted that the
loans are helpful until some kind of crisis occurs, usually a drop in sales or an illness. The same
respondent in the previous quote admitted that it is hard to make the payment when sales are low.
For survey 51 I chatted with a husband and wife who had both received loans from Génesis. The
wife had stopped taking loans and working because of a sudden serious illness. Her husband
works in carpentry, and many respondents noted that sales are down in that profession. He said,
“When there’s no work, I feel like we may not make the payment.” They have missed two since
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his wife became sick, and are only making them now because their teenaged sons are working
over Christmas break. “The support of my wife’s income is fundamental for us to pay the loan,”
he said, so things have been very difficult since she had to stop working. Another case is that of
Respondent 80, who at the age of 23 became “sick for two months. I didn’t know what was
wrong with me. I went to four clinics and they all told me different things.” Génesis raised her
interest rate because she could not pay, but fortunately she was able to get back to work and they
lowered the rate again. Respondents 27, 53 and 61 had similar problems when sales dropped.
Number 60 took a loan “years ago” to start a small food store that failed. She said that “the loan
did help, but when sales dropped at the store, it got hard.” She defaulted and the bank raised her
interest rate.
The situation variable gives a good overview of the opinions expressed in the quotes
above. I broke it down to see how many respondents feel that their economic situation worsened
or bettered after receiving microloans. According to a tabulation of the variable, as seen below in
Figure 4.1, most respondents feel that their economic situation has improved either a little or a
lot since receiving a loan. In addition, the median value for the situation variable is 3, showing
that most respondents feel that their economic situations are a little better post-loan, thereby
supporting my hypothesis that receiving microcredit increases personal economic well-being.
However, the particular kind of loan does not seem to influence the borrower’s economic
situation. Using ordered logistic regression, I analyzed the influence of the three different loan
kinds (1=business, 2=home, 3=mix) on whether the respondent thinks her current economic
situation is worse, the same, a little better or significantly better than before receiving loans.
None were significant. Neither were the variables representing the age of the recipient when she
received her first loan, nor the percentage of her life during which she received them. The only
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significant variable was the control representing the average amount, in quetzals, of each
recipient’s loans, but the model itself did not seem to be significant since it had a low chi-square
and high p-value.7

Figure 4.1: Respondents’ estimation of post-loan economic situation

To apply incomebuspct to the hypothesis of whether microloans lead to increased wellbeing, I simply took its average. On average, the businesses of respondents show a 148.74%
increase in income after receiving a loan. This average was calculated using the 53 observations
of the incomebuspct variable. The median increase in income is a similar 120%.8 Only three
borrowers report a decrease in income, while 14 report no change and the remaining 36
borrowers report an increase in income between 4% and 1500%. Finally, I averaged the 59
values for thingsploan and found an average increase of one possession after receiving a loan.
This is only a descriptive statistic, of course, and the Poisson regression analysis presented in
7
8

I do not report the full model statistics in a table because of the lack of significant results.
When an outlier is removed (a 1500% increase in income), the mean becomes 122%, almost equal to the median.
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Table 4.2 using things as the dependent variable shows that receiving a loan does not seem to
influence the current number of possessions owned by an individual.

Conclusions of Hypothesis 1 Tests
The results of the tests of my first hypothesis are mixed. According to ordered logistic
regression analysis, borrowers are “making it” more easily than non-borrowers. However, as
shown by the things regression analyses, receiving a loan does not seem to increase the number
of key possessions that the recipient owns. Age, education level, urban or rural home, gender and
ethnicity do seem to influence the number of possessions a person owns. Within the loan
recipient dataset the answer is slightly different, since descriptive statistics show that the
possessions of recipients increase by one object after receiving a loan. Regression analysis,
though, concludes that neither kind of loan nor percentage of age receiving a loan influences the
number of possessions, meaning that if it is true that receiving a loan increases the number of
belongings, this effect must not increase over time nor depend on the kind of loan. Consequently,
the number of an individual’s possessions does not appear to be related to receiving loans, which
contradicts the descriptive increase in objects reported by borrowers.
This story is repeated when my focus turns to the sample of loan recipients exclusively,
since all of the descriptive statistics seem to show that people involved in microcredit have a
higher standard of living, but further analysis reveals no statistically significant relationship
between receiving a loan and well-being. Most recipients think they are “making it” more easily
than they were before taking loans, but the correlation is not significant. The situation variable is
similar, descriptively showing that most recipients feel better off now than before receiving
loans, but ordered logistic regression shows no influence by the kind of loan or amount of time
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receiving it on their economic situation. In addition, businesses of respondents show an average
150% increase in income generation after taking loans.
Although the results of these tests are mixed, I believe there is enough support for my
hypothesis. All of the descriptive statistics point toward a positive correlation between receiving
a loan and well-being. The ordered logistic regression analysis on makingitcurr provides a more
reliable measure with the same results. This analysis also shows that receiving loans, especially
business loans and any loan received over time, substantively and positively influences the
respondents’ perceived economic situation. The other tests yield no statistically significant
results, so there are no findings indicating a negative relationship by loan borrowing on
perceived situation. Since the findings for the makingitcurr variable are so strong, I conclude that
the lack of findings for these couple of variables is probably due to the small number of
observations being tested and the lack of variability in such a limited dataset.

4.1.2 H2: Child health
Illness Propensity
To test the first part of this hypothesis, that the children of loan borrowers are less likely
to have had a serious childhood disease, I use the binary variable illness (Variable 35) as the
dependent variable in a series of logistic regression models. Of 291 children of respondents, 61
or about 21% had experienced a serious illness. The most common diseases reported were
bronchopneumonia and other lung problems (17 children), infections requiring hospitalization,
particularly gastrointestinal ones (10 children), serious allergic reactions (5 cases), hepatitis (4
cases) and appendicitis (4 cases).9 These severe episodes of bronchopneumonia typically could
have been prevented with better medical care, and hepatitis can be prevented by receiving extra
9

Malaria and dengue fever are more common in Eastern than Western Guatemala.
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vaccinations and by eating food that was not poorly prepared. Therefore the most common
diseases reported would likely have been prevented if the family had a higher income.
The three independent variables are the simple binary yesornoloan, percentage of the
child’s age during which his parent has been receiving loans (pctageloan), and the dichotomous
yesnobusn, whether the respondent receives particularly business loans. Five control variables
representing ethnicity, age, gender of child, urban or rural home and whether the child has
completed basic education are also included. The results when each independent variable is run
in an individual model, including the five control variables in each, are presented in Table 4.3.
Two of the independent variables, those representing receiving any kind of loan and receiving a
business loan, are statistically significant. Surprisingly, the results indicate that receiving loans
increases child illness propensity. Since this analysis was conducted using logistic regression,
additional tests must be run to interpret the coefficient. The predicted probabilities of change in
the dependant variable computed for Model 3a are found in the column next to the results for
that model. If the respondent receives any kind of loan, the probability of her children having a
serious illness is 12% greater than a respondent who has never received a loan (min->max/0->1
= .1168). This effect is slightly more pronounced for business loans; if the respondent has
received one, the probability of her children having a serious illness is 13% greater than a
respondent who has not received a business loan (min->max/0->1 = .1326). The only significant
control variable is parent education, and it remains significant in each model. Changing the
respondent’s level of education from its minimum to its maximum decreases the probability of
his or her children having a serious illness by about 8% (min!max= .0866/.0829).
The pseudo r-squared values for both of these models are quite low, indicating that the
models account for little of the variance in the dependent variable – only five or six percent. The
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Table 4.3
Logistic regression on illness with robust standard errors clustered on respondent
Independent
Variables

Model 3a
(yesornoloan)

Coefficient

Model 3b
(pctageloan)

Model 3c
(yesnobusn)

Coefficient

.8623** (.4283)

.1168

--

--

--

pctageloan

--

--

.0020 (.0051)

--

--

yesnobusn

--

--

--

.8859** (.3562)

.1326

indigenous

.2471 (.3647)

.0371

.2856 (.3565)

.3423 (.3563)

.0509

urbanrural

.1479 (.2216)

.0443

-.0088 (.2156)

.0599 (.2204)

.0179

-.0154 (.0179)

-.1091

-.0177 (.0175)

-.0192 (.0174)

-.1316

.0359 (.2700)

.0054

.0400 (.2682)

.0414 (.2717)

.0062

-.1900** (.0866)

-.1955

-.1812** (.0853)

-.1577* (.0829)

-.1647

-1.620* (.8883)

-.7312 (.8586)

-1.403* (.7902)

.0455

.0297

.0568

11.17*

7.50

16.15**

283

283

283

yesornoloan

age
female
parenteduc
constant
Psuedo R2
Wald chi-square
number of
observations

First entry is the unstandardized coefficient, followed by the standard error in parentheses.
***p!.01; **p!.05; *p!.10.
Coefficient = discrete change in the predicted probabilities for a minimum to maximum increase in the independent
variable. Computed using prchange command, looking at the min!max column. Since the dependent variable is
binary, there is only one coefficient to report.

results of the models, then, are notably marginal. However, there is a statistically significant
effect of receiving loans, particularly business loans, on child illness. This finding contradicts my
hypothesis that receiving a loan decreases the likelihood of illness.
A disturbing trend emerges when theses tests are run again in sub-populations based on
gender. When I restricted the sample to women, I found that receiving any loan or receiving a
business loan has a positive and statistically significant effect on illness propensity; when I
restricted the sample to men, I found that as percentage of age receiving a loan increases, the
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probability of having a childhood illness decreases. The results for the female sub-sample are
reported in Table 4.4, and those of the male sample are reported in Table 4.5. Since the same
independent variables are not significant in both sub-samples, we cannot directly compare the
difference in their effects.10 We can see that among female respondents, borrowing has a
significant positive effect on illness propensity: taking any loan increases the likelihood that the
respondent’s child has had a serious childhood illness by about 13% (min!max=12.55). On the
Table 4.4
Logistic regression on illness with robust standard errors clustered on respondent, female subsample
Independent
Variables

Model 4a
(yesornoloan)

Coefficient

Model 4b
(yesnobusn)

Coefficient

.9214** (.4459)

.1255

--

--

yesnobusn

--

--

1.120*** (.3964)

.1615

indigenous

.4574 (.4149)

.0703

.5428 (.4048)

.0819

urbanrural

.2040 (.2497)

.0620

.1906 (.2541)

.0568

-.0234 (.0193)

-.1635

-.0223 (.0197)

-.1541

.1587 (.2890)

.0243

.1370 (.2980)

.0206

-.2017** (.0971)

-.2088

-.1418 (.0971)

-.1509

yesornoloan

age
female
parenteduc
constant
Psuedo R2
Wald chi-square
number of observations

-1.756* (.9645)

-2.001** (.9199)

.0646

.0824

13.90**

19.26***

220

220

First entry is the unstandardized coefficient, followed by the standard error in parentheses.
***p!.01; **p!.05; *p!.10.
Coefficient = discrete change in the predicted probabilities for a minimum to maximum increase in the independent
variable. Computed using prchange command, looking at the min!max column. Since the dependent variable is
binary, there is only one coefficient to report.

10

I do not report the insignificant results in the tables; namely, those for the independent variable pctageloan in the
female sub-sample, and those for yesornoloan and yesnobusn in the male sub-sample.
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Table 4.5
Logistic regression on illness with robust standard errors clustered on respondent, male subsample
Independent
Variables

Model 5
(pctageloan)

Coefficient

pctageloan

-.0500*** (.0193)

-.3670

indigenous

-2.156** (1.035)

-.2083

urbanrural

-1.786*** (.5546)

-.3007

age

.0135 (.0613)

.0407

female

.1056 (.8069)

.0078

-.1565 (.2136)

-.0761

parenteduc
constant
Psuedo R2
Wald chi-square
number of observations

4.569 (2.161)
.2128
14.15**
63

First entry is the unstandardized coefficient, followed by the standard error in parentheses.
***p!.01; **p!.05; *p!.10.
Coefficient = discrete change in the predicted probabilities for a minimum to maximum increase in the independent
variable. Computed using prchange command, looking at the min!max column. Since the dependent variable is
binary, there is only one coefficient to report.

other hand, among male respondents, increasing the percentage of a child’s life receiving a loan
from its minimum to its maximum decreases the probability of illness by 37% (min!max=.3670). Increasing the percentage of life receiving a loan by 10% decreases the possibility of
illness by about 4% (-+1/2=-.0037 for one percent increase). Therefore it seems that the negative
effect among male borrowers is slightly smaller than the positive effect among females.
It should be noted that restricting the sample to men leaves only 63 observations for
testing. However, the r-squared of that model, 22%, is substantially stronger than those of the
female sub-sample, which are only 7 to 8%. Again, perhaps including a control variable for age
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at first loan would change the results of this test; maybe women see illness among their children
and choose to take loans to try and help them, while men take loans for other reasons, and if age
at first loan were included we would see that most illness occurred before loans. This seems
unlikely, however, since the variables for age and age at first loan are highly correlated, and age
is already included as a control in these models.

Immunization Probability
To test the second part of H4, that the children of borrowers are more likely to have
received their immunizations, I used the binary variable immun (Variable 43) as the dependent
variable in a series of logistic regression models. Due to the limited amount of variance in the
dependent variable, my results for these analyses yielded no significant results. As I conducted
the surveys I was surprised to find that the children of almost all respondents had been
immunized. Of my total sample of 298 children, only 11 had not received their immunizations,
or 3.7% of the sample. This is more or less consistent with countrywide data, as the World
Health Organization estimated in 2009 that about 93% of children had received the suggested
battery of immunizations (WHO 2010).
When I noticed this trend I began asking respondents where they got their children’s
immunizations, and nearly everyone said that they had received them at the local “puesto de
salud,” small clinics that give free government-funded immunizations. I saw the clinics in
virtually every small community I visited, so lack of resources and distance did not seem to be
factors that kept people from immunizing. When asked why they did not immunize a child,
parents gave one of three responses: that they were too young when they gave birth to know
what to do (Respondent 67), that they did not have time to leave their business to take their child
(Respondents 9, 72, 80), or that their own parent told them not to immunize because it gives the
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child a fever (Respondents 84 and 96). The latter response is a vestige of old suspicions
concerning immunizations, especially among the indigenous populations. The two women who
gave me this response have realized the importance of immunizing, and both expressed regret
that they did not take their children. Respondent 84 said, “They got fevers, and I thought it
wasn’t necessary. I feel ignorant now. I wish I had done it.” Thus negative attitudes toward
vaccination seem to be dropping substantially in the childbearing-age population. Due to these
factors, immunization is becoming widespread in Guatemala. It is worth noting, though, that
three of the six parents who did not immunize did not do so due to the pressures of their personal
businesses.

Conclusions of Hypothesis 2 Tests
When analysis is conducted using the general sample of respondents concerning the
impact of receiving microloans on child illness propensity, a slight positive relationship is
detected. Contrary to the hypothesis, then, receiving a microloan increases the likelihood that the
respondent’s child will have had a serious illness. When this analysis is run in gender sub-sets,
the difference between the effect of microloans on child illness for men and women is quite
marked. Among female respondents, receiving a microloan increases the likelihood of child
illness by 13%, and receiving a business loan increases the possibility by 16%. Among men, the
effect reverses; receiving a loan decreases the probability of childhood illness, as I originally
hypothesized. Apparently the effects of receiving microcredit depend heavily on the gender of
the recipient, and in this case, women receiving loans actually leads to the opposite of the
hypothesized effect.
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4.1.3 H3: Child education

Completion of Mandatory Education
To test the hypothesis that the children of loan borrowers are likely to attend more
schooling than the children of non-borrowers, I use the ordinal variable complete (Variable 33)
as the dependent variable in a series of ordered logistic regression models.11 This variable
assigns a value of 0 to children who are too young to attend school, a value of 1 to children who
did not complete all years of school for their ages, 2 for children who are currently enrolled in
school but behind by three years or less, and 3 for children who have completed all years of
schooling suitable for their ages.12 The “suitable” amount of education is calculated based on the
child’s progress through the legally mandatory years of schooling. These include grades one
through six, known as “primaría” and equivalent to primary school in the United States for ages
7 through 12, and grades seven through nine, called the “básicos” and somewhat equivalent to
our middle school for ages 13 through 15 (International Bureau of Education 2010). For instance,
if a child is 13 and is currently enrolled in her first year of básico, then she is coded as a 3 for
having completed all appropriate years of schooling. Of my 306-child sample, 55 are too young
to have attended school.13 Of the 261 children who are school-age, 55 or about 21% did not
complete the suitable amount of schooling, 6 or about 2% are behind by three years or less, and

11

I also attempted to test the impact of receiving microcredit on literacy. Since only 3 children could not fully read
and write out of 245 children old enough to do so, there was not enough variation in that variable to acheive any
statistically significant results.
12 This variable is technically nominal and not ordinal level when the 0 values are included. Therefore I created a
new variable, complete2, only including observations coded 1-3. I used both complete and complete2 in the same
tests, and found that when complete was used, the only statistically significant variable was age. This is to be
expected; age and the 0 value are highly correlated, since any child under the age of 5 has a 0 value for complete.
For that reason I do not report the results of the tests using complete, and only those of complete2.
13 This is a fuzzy area, since children are allowed to go to pre-primary school from the ages of 4 to 6. If the
respondent told me that her child under 7 is attending pre-primary, I coded that child as a 3. If the respondent told
me that her child under 7 is not attending school yet, I coded that child as a 0, or too young to be attending school.

59

200 or about 77% have completed the appropriate amount of schooling. Consequently I have a
decent amount of variation in my sample.
To focus on adults who have had the opportunity to go to college, I also tested my
education hypothesis using the ordinal variable adulteduc as the dependent variable in a new
series of ordered logistic regression models.14 This variable codes any child who is still enrolled
in school below the university level or too young to be in school as 0; therefore any child whose
observation for adulteduc is coded 1-9 is no longer enrolled in school, and his or her value for
the variable expresses the last stage of schooling that he or she completed. Of 306 children, 194
are currently in school or too young to be in school, so 112 children who have stopped attending
school comprise the adulteduc2 sample. These children are coded from 1 = child received no
formal education, to 10 = child is currently attending university (see Variable 26 for more
details). This measure is able to capture a wider range of education than the complete variable,
since it looks past the mandatory schooling years to secondary and university education.
Secondary education after the mandatory básicos is called the ciclo diversificado or carera, and
involves two to three years of training either in a career or in preparation for university
(International Bureau of Education 2010). There is a fairly nice distribution of observations
across categories, except for the secondary-school graduation category (7 = child graduated from
career), where 33 observations cluster.
The ordered logistic analyses conducted on complete2 and adulteduc2 did not yield any
significant results for the main independent variables, so I do not include them here. In the
complete2 models, the control variables for increased parent education level and living in a more
14

This variable is technically nominal and not ordinal level when the 0 values are included. Therefore I created a
new variable, adulteduc2, with only observations coded 1-3. I used both adulteduc and adulteduc2 in the same tests,
and found that when adulteduc was used, the only statistically significant variable was age. This is to be expected;
age and the 0 value are highly correlated, since most children under the age of about 18 have a 0 value for
adulteduc. For that reason I do not report the results of the tests using adulteduc, and only those of adulteduc2.
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urban area have a positive, significant effect on likelihood of completion of mandatory
schooling. The control variable for child age has a significant negative effect. Age is obviously a
major factor in determining school completion, which is intuitive for a number of reasons. First,
the older the child, the more likely he or she will drop out. Also, attitudes concerning education
have changed greatly in the past few decades. Many parents told me that they had received little
education as children, for a number of reasons. Some pointed out that education is more essential
now, and jobs that used to have no education minimum now require the government-mandatory
years of schooling (Respondent 27). Others mentioned that attitudes about girls’ role in
education have changed. According to one fifty-year-old woman who dropped out of school after
the third grade, “My family didn’t want me to keep going. They thought that only boys should
study” (Respondent 87). A K’iche-speaking woman, age 48, who completed only the second
grade said, “They didn’t give you the opportunity. My mom said, the ones that matter more are
the boys” (Respondent 88). However, parents did not exclusively keep their female children
away from school. They often did not want their male children to attend, either. According to
survey 57 with a married couple in their early thirties who dropped out after the sixth grade,
neither of their parents wanted to keep spending the money to send them to school.
Others quit school due to lack of opportunity and pressing financial circumstances.
Sometimes facilities were not close enough to make attending school regularly a viable option,
or their parents simply did not have the money to continue sending them. Respondents 63 and
94, women in their forties, stated that “There were no possibilities for going to school,” and
“They didn’t give people the opportunity.” Respondent 92 said she went to work after the sixth
grade because “in those days, there was not a lot to choose from.” In most cases the family
needed another set of working hands. Respondent 80 entered the family flower business after the
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fourth grade, a trade in which she still works, because “I couldn’t [go to school] anymore. My
dad wanted me to work.” Many women went straight into low-skill work, especially
housekeeping, when their parents put them into the workforce (Respondents 69 and 53).
Much of this bleak situation has changed. Government efforts have made education more
accessible, both in terms of distance and resources required to attend. A related significant
control variable in the mandatory education completion model is urbanrural. If a child lives in a
more urban area it increases the probability of her completing all required years of education by
32% (min!max = .3232). Obviously further work is needed to make education easily accessible
to all members of society. Nonetheless, significant strides have been made to make education
more accessible to all, and attitudes have changed substantially on the importance of education
and girls in the classroom.
As for the particular effects of microloans on child education, the main sample seems to
indicate that there is no effect. When the sample is broken down on gender lines, however, the
picture changes. In the male sub-sample, receiving any kind of loan has a positive, significant
effect on education completion, as seen in Table 4.7. Given the small sample size, the standard
errors of the model are questionable, as are the predicted probabilities of change; more variation
in the variables is needed to have better estimates of these relationships. Given the high r-squared
of the model and its level of significance, though, it is clear that receiving a loan has an
important positive effect on education in the male sample.
In the sample of women, the effect of the independent variables on complete2 was not
significant. However, receiving a loan appears to have a negative effect on adulteduc2 in the
female sample. The results in Table 4.6 show that receiving a loan has a negative, significant
effect on achieving higher levels of education. While receiving a loan makes attainment of more
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Table 4.6
Ordered logistic regression on adulteduc2 with robust standard errors clustered on respondent,
female sub-sample
Independent
Variables

Model 6
(yesornoloan)

Coefficient

-1.028* (.5872)

-.0985

indigenous

-0761 (.7036)

-.0063

urbanrural

1.733*** (.4502)

.2923

age

-.0856** (.0435)

-.2163

.1856 (.4068)

.0152

.3362*** (.1154)

.3855

yesornoloan

female
parenteduc
!1

-1.902 (2.216)

!2

-.4118 (1.890)

!3

.7678 (1.749)

!4

1.209 (1.767)

!5

1.712 (1.721)

!6

1.944 (1.697)

!7

4.066 (1.660)

!8

4.262 (1.668)

Psuedo R2
Wald chi-square
number of
observations

.1946
30.19***
93

First entry is the unstandardized coefficient, followed by the standard error in parentheses.
***p!.01; **p!.05; *p!.10.
Coefficient = discrete change in the predicted probabilities for a minimum to maximum increase in the independent
variable. Computed using prchange command, looking at the min!max column. The coefficient listed is the
predicted probably of change for the dependent when it is coded 9.
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Table 4.7
Ordered logistic regression on complete2 with robust standard errors clustered on respondent,
male sub-sample
Independent
Variables

Model 7
(yesornoloan)

Coefficient

yesornoloan

58.32*** (23.32)

.9999

indigenous

-17.11*** (2.108)

-.0001

urbanrural

27.74*** (10.30)

.9999

age

.0307 (.2012)

.0000

female

.7905 (1.259)

.0000

parenteduc

2.218 (1.835)

.0000

!1

72.71 (38.19)

!2

73.05 (38.26)

Psuedo R2
Wald chi-square
number of observations

.6146
473.56***
57

First entry is the unstandardized coefficient, followed by the standard error in parentheses.
***p!.01; **p!.05; *p!.10.
Coefficient = discrete change in the predicted probabilities for a minimum to maximum increase in the independent
variable. Computed using prchange command, looking at the min!max column. The coefficient listed is the
predicted probably of change for the dependent when it is coded 3.

education 99% more likely in the male sample, receiving one makes it 10% less likely among
female respondents (min!max=.9999/-.0985). As in the tests of the full sample of data, living in
a more urban area has a positive effect on education in both models. All statistically significant
control variables also show relationships in the correct direction, so the only surprising finding in
these two models is the difference between the effects of receiving loans.
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Conclusions of Hypothesis 3 Tests
Neither of the dependent variables used to test the hypothesis yield statistically
significant results. However, when the tests were run for sub-samples of male and female
borrowers, significant effects arose. In the male sub-sample, the dichotomous measure of having
received any kind of loan is significant for the complete2 variable looking at completion of
government-mandatory education. This test shows that receiving any kind of loan has a large
positive effect on child education completion among male recipients. On the other hand, among
female respondents, receiving any kind of loan has a negative effect on the adulteduc2 variable,
which stands for the final level of education completed by children who are now adults. In other
words, among male recipients receiving a loan increases child education, in line with my
hypothesis, while receiving a loan actually decreases child education in the female sample.

4.1.4 H4: Child birthrate
Number of Children
To test the first part of H4, that the children of recipients have fewer children, I use the
count-level variable numgrandkids (38) as the dependent variable in a number of Poisson
regression models. This variable reports the number of children that the children of each
recipient have had; in other words, the number of grandchildren each recipient has by each of
their children. Of 300 children of respondents, 245 have not yet had children of their own.15 Of
those who have had children, 16 have had one child, 17 have had 2 children, 16 have had 3
children, and 6 have had between 4 and 7 children.
Table 4.8 reports the results for Poisson regression analyses on the number of
grandchildren of the respondent, including the three standard independent variables and five
15

Due to missing data 60 observations were dropped, making 246 the total number of observations in these models.
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Table 4.8
Poisson regression on numgrandkids with robust standard errors clustered on respondent
Independent
Variables

Model 8a
(yesornoloan)

Percent
change

Model 8b
(pctageloan)

Percent
change

Model 8c
(yesnobusn)

Percent
change

.6218*
(.3386)

86.2

--

--

--

--

pctageloan

--

--

.0005 (.0054)

--

--

yesnobusn

--

--

--

.6724**
(.2906)

95.9

indigenous

.0357 (.3096)

.0050 (.3191)

.0295 (.2993)

urbanrural

.3012 (.2405)

.2236 (.2108)

.3030 (.2481)

yesornoloan

age

--

.1187***
(.0138)

12.6

.1056***
(.0164)

11.1

.1168***
(.0135)

12.4

.4052**
(.1966)

50.0

.4423**
(.2173)

55.6

.4121**
(.2018)

51.0

complete2

-.3931**
(.1823)

-32.5

-.3334*
(.1754)

-28.4

-.3916**
(.1896)

-32.4

parenteduc

.1417*
(.0820)

15.2

.1113 (.0701)

.1490*
(.0789)

16.1

-4.396***
(.6714)

-3.560***
(.6967)

-4.356***
(.6324)

99.76***

65.24***

114.56***

246

246

246

female

constant
Wald chisquare
number of
observations

First entry is the unstandardized coefficient, followed by the standard error in parentheses.
***p!.01; **p!.05; *p!.10
Percent change = percent change in expected count for unit increase in independent variable. Percent change
coefficients were computed using listcoef command with the percent option.

control variables. As you can see in Models 8a and 8c, both the simple yes-or-no loan variable
and the business loan variable have a significant positive effect on the number of children born to
the children of the respondent. Increased age and being a female child also have positive effects
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across the models, while completing the mandatory years of public education has a negative
effect on the number of children born to children of the respondents. Referring to the predicted
probabilities in the columns next to the model, if a respondent receives any kind of loan, his or
her expected number of grandchildren increases by about 86%, holding other variables constant.
If a respondent receives a business loan, his or her expected number of grandchildren increases
by a surprising 96%, or nearly one child. In comparison, being female increases the number by
around 50%, and completing mandatory schooling decreases the number of grandchildren by
only about 32%. A year of additional age increases the number of grandchildren by around 12%,
and a standard deviation increase in age (8.810) induces a 185% increase in the expected number
of grandchildren (%StdX=184.6).
These results directly contradict my hypothesis. Instead of microcredit involvement
having a negative impact on the number of children born to the children of recipients, it has a
positive effect. Microloan recipients are likely to have more grandchildren than non-loan
recipients. This is especially true for the children of business loan recipients, and does not seem
to be contingent on time receiving loans.

Age at First Birth
To test the second part of H4, that the children of recipients have children at a later age, I
use the ratio-level variable agefirstbirth2 (Variable 31) as the dependent variable in a number of
ordinary least squares regression analyses. This variable records the age at first birth for each
child of the respondent. Of 306 children, only 55 have had their own children, so those 55
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observations comprise the agefirstbirth216 sample. Of these, 20 were 18 or under when they gave
birth for the first time, 24 were between 19 and 21, and 11 were 22 or older (up to age 29).
Table 4.9 shows the results of the ordinary least squares regression analyses on
agefirstbirth2, using the typical independent and control variables. Two of the independent
variables, receiving any kind of loan and percentage of age receiving loans, have a negative and
statistically significant effect on the age at first birth of the respondent’s children. Receiving any
kind of loan decreases the age at first birth by 2.1 years. Each increase of one percent in the
percentage of a child’s age during which his or her parent has received microloans decreases the
child’s age at first birth by .05 years. In addition, the control for child education level positively
affects the dependent variable. Having completed all mandatory years of schooling increases the
age at first birth by about 1.3 years. The additional control variables that are important in the
other test of child birth rate – child age, child gender, and parent education – are not significant
in this analysis. Perhaps this could be due to the notably smaller number of observations in the
second model. When the number of grandchildren of the respondent is being assessed, children
of respondents who have never given birth can be included in the sample and coded as 0. In this
analysis of age at first birth, however, children who have not yet given birth cannot be included
in the sample, so the number of observations drops from 246 to 55. The r-squared remains fairly
high, though, accounting for between 31 to 35 percent of the variance in the dependent variable.
According to the results of the regression analyses on agefirstbirth2, I must reject my
hypothesis that microcredit leads the children of recipients to give birth for the first time later
than the children of non-recipients. In fact the results show that the effect is opposite to the one
hypothesized, and involvement in microcredit decreases the age at first birth of the children of
16

The age at first birth for any person who has not had children is coded as 0. Since this is basically missing data, I
dropped the zeroes and created a new variable, agefirstbirth2. For that reason I did not run any analysis using
agefirstbirth, only agefirstbirth2.
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Table 4.9
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on agefirstbirth2 with robust standard errors clustered
on respondent
Independent
Variables

Model 9a
(yesornoloan)

Model 9b
(pctageloan)

Model 9c
(yesnobusn)

yesornoloan

-2.118* (1.190)

--

--

pctageloan

--

-.0523* (.0290)

--

yesnobusn

--

--

-1.733 (1.137)

indigenous

-.4111 (.6226)

.2339 (.4737)

-.3743 (.6733)

urbanrural

-.4349 (.4443)

-.3637 (.4165)

-.4407 (.5114)

age

.0567 (.0595)

.0947* (.0490)

.0788 (.0585)

female

-.1408 (.6514)

-.2737 (.6554)

-.3437 (.6025)

complete2

1.261* (.6469)

1.209* (.6662)

1.230* (.6987)

parenteduc

-.2834 (.2924)

-.1415 (.2490)

-.2826 (.3171)

constant

19.18*** (2.720)

16.95*** (1.996)

18.42*** (2.591)

R2

.3489

.3090

.3207

F value

5.13***

7.13***

4.51***

number of
observations

55

55

55

First entry is the unstandardized coefficient, followed by the standard error in parentheses.
***p!.01; **p!.05; *p!.10

recipients. This effect is significant for two of the three independent variables and seems to be
somewhat contingent on time receiving loans.
This picture is again changed when the sample is broken down on gender lines. Table
4.10 shows the results of analysis on the number of grandchildren born to respondents in the
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Table 4.10
Poisson regression on numgrandkids with robust standard errors clustered on respondent, female
sub-sample
Independent
Variables

Model 10a
(yesornoloan)

Percent
change

Model 10b
(yesnobusn)

Percent
change

1.014*** (.3889)

175.6

--

--

yesnobusn

--

--

.9194*** (.3143)

150.8

indigenous

-.3392 (.3750)

-.3397 (.3632)

urbanrural

-.0417 (.2797)

-.0122 (.3126)

yesornoloan

age
female

.1267*** (.0141)

13.5

.1204*** (.0164)

12.8

.5530** (.2694)

73.9

.5603** (.2754)

75.1

complete2

-.1423 (.2597)

-.1694 (.2954)

parenteduc

-.2017(.0971)

.1549 (.0999)

-4.715*** (.7842)

-4.476*** (.7622)

147.56***

136.70***

189

189

constant
Wald chi-square
number of observations

First entry is the unstandardized coefficient, followed by the standard error in parentheses.
***p!.01; **p!.05; *p!.10.
Percent change = percent change in expected count for unit increase in independent variable. Percent change
coefficients were computed using listcoef command with the percent option.

female sub-sample, and Table 4.11 shows the same for the male sample.17 Among female
respondents, receiving any kind of loan has a strong positive impact on number of grandchildren.
Receiving any loan increases the expected count of grandchildren by nearly 176%. This effect is
slightly weaker for business loans in particular at 151%. These effects cannot be directly
compared to male respondents, because neither of these independent variables is significant in
the male sub-set. However, among men, as the percentage of a child’s life receiving microloans

17

The tests on adult education level were not significant in the female and male sub-samples, probably due to the
very small number of observations in each group.
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Table 4.11
Poisson regression on numgrandkids with robust standard errors clustered on respondent, male
sub-sample
Independent
Variables

Model 11
(yesornoloan)

Percent change

pctageloan

-.0295* (.0176)

-2.9

indigenous

1.603 (1.008)

urbanrural

-.0561 (.4183)

age

.1770*** (.0413)

female

-.1329 (.2728)

complete2

-.3726 (.3846)

parenteduc

-.3109* (.1707)

constant

19.4

36.5

-5.877*** (1.952)

Wald chi-square
number of observations

3766.46***
57

First entry is the unstandardized coefficient, followed by the standard error in parentheses.
***p!.01; **p!.05; *p!.10.
Percent change = percent change in expected count for unit increase in independent variable. Percent change
coefficients were computed using listcoef command with the percent option.

increases by 1%, the number of children that child will have decreases by 3%, and a standard
deviation increase in percent of age receiving loans (34.6725) induces a 64% decrease in the
expected number of grandchildren (%StdX=-64.0). Hence we see that receiving a microloan
increases the number of grandchildren born to a respondent in the female sub-sample, while it
decreases the number of grandchildren born to male respondents.

Conclusions of Hypothesis 4 Tests
The results of the two tests investigating the impact of microcredit on birth patterns do
not support my hypothesis. Instead of leading to a decline in fertility, involvement in microcredit
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leads to a second-generation increase in birth. In other words, the offspring of loan recipients
have more children than the offspring of non-borrowers. In a similar vein, microcredit
involvement does not increase the age at first birth of the children of recipients. Rather, it
decreases that age. While contradictory to my hypothesis, this result is not unprecedented in the
literature. Numerous studies have claimed that increasing family income and especially that of
women, who microcredit targets in Guatemala and elsewhere, leads to increases in birth rates
since the family has more income to devote to maintaining children. However, this effect has
typically only been investigated on the first-generation level. It is very interesting to see it play
out for the children of recipients. From my survey experience I can think of one possible reason
that this first-generation phenomena would apply to the second. Many of the respondents I spoke
to said that some if not all of their adult children continued to live at home. An increase in
income for the recipient would obviously accrue benefits for anyone in the home. However, by
conducting these tests on male and female sub-samples, I find that this positive effect is limited
to women borrowers. It seems that when men borrow microloans, fewer grandchildren result.
The positive effect remains significant in the female sample, and does not depend on the kind of
loan.

4.2

Hypotheses Concerning First and Second-Generation Personal Effects
According to the literature on microcredit, for most participants the act of borrowing

from the microcredit institution is their first direct contact with the formal economy (H5), since
they likely have never taken a loan from any other formal source and operate their businesses in
the informal sector. The decision to take this loan may be due to that individual’s heightened
sense of economic self-efficacy, the belief that economic success can be achieved through
personal entrepreneurial action, or becoming involved in microcredit may be the catalyst that
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creates that sense of self-efficacy. Either way, an individual’s involvement in microcredit should
be correlated with a greater sense of economic self-efficacy (H6). If involvement in microcredit
leads borrowers to more contact with the formal economy, and they learn that exercising
economic self-efficacy in the formal economy leads to a higher standard of well-being, they
should encourage their children to become more integrated into the formal, high-skill economy.
This means that their children should be more likely to work in high-skill jobs in the formal
sector (H6: Career).

4.2.1 H5: Recipient first interaction with formal economy
To investigate respondents’ level of interaction with the formal economy, I look to two
variables: receipts (Variable 17) and loanhistory (Variable 11). The first is a binary variable,
coded 0 if the respondent’s business does not issue receipts and 1 if it does. If a business does not
issue receipts, then it does not pay government taxes, which means it operates in the informal
economy. Of 95 respondents for which I have this information, only 20 issue receipts. This is
not surprising since I interviewed small business owners; their profit margins are so low that they
are typically not required to pay taxes. The next variable, loanhistory, is ordinal-level and reports
the respondent’s first and subsequent loan experiences. It is coded 1 if the respondent never
received a loan, 2 if the respondent has only received informal loans, 3 if the respondent took
informal loans before taking a formal microloan, 4 if the respondent has only taken microloans,
and 5 if the respondent’s first loan was over 25,000 quetzals, what would be considered a normal
bank loan. Of 95 respondents, only 5 have taken a normal bank loan, and only one of them
started out with a microloan. Three of those respondents have since taken out small microloans
to supplement their businesses. 31 respondents have never received a loan. Five respondents took
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informal loans before taking a microloan, but no one had taken only informal loans. Finally, 54
respondents have taken only microloans.
Table 4.12
loanhistory by receipts
Receives no kind
of loans

Receives
microloans

Total

Receives regular
bank loans

Does not issue
receipts

22

52

1

75

Does issue receipts

9

7

4

20

Total

31

59

5

95

chi-square

14.64***

N

95

***p!.001

By cross-tabulating these two variables we can see how many respondents with each loan
history issue receipts. Observations coded 2 through 4 are considered microloan borrowers, so
these observations are lumped together in the second column. 80% of the normal loan recipients
seen in the last column issue receipts, while only 29% of non-borrowers in the first column do
so. Even fewer microcredit recipients, 12%, issue receipts. In line with the literature, then, my
sample shows that most microcredit recipients operate in the informal sector. This relationship is
statistically significant, as the Pearson’s chi-squared value for the cross-tabulation is 14.64 and
significant to the .001 level. Of 64 loan recipients, only 5 had received a real bank loan prior to
receiving a microloan. Of that 93% of loan recipients whose first loan was a microloan, 88% do
not give receipts. In other words, loan recipients who do not give receipts comprise 88% of the
total sample of microloan recipients. This is a 17-point increase over non-recipients of
microloans, since 71% of non-recipients do not issue receipts. Also in line with the literature,
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then, involvement in microcredit provides the first interaction with the formal economy for most
borrowers. This is true for 88% of borrowers, in fact, since they are not already involved through
paying taxes or through a regular bank loan. These results offer support for my hypothesis that
the first interaction with the formal economy for most microloan borrowers is upon taking the
microloan itself. They also show that most recipients continue to operate their businesses in the
informal economy after receiving loans.

4.2.2 H6: Recipient economic self-efficacy
To test whether involvement in microcredit leads to or is even correlated with a greater
sense of economic self-efficacy, I look to the variables control and hardwork. Both are ordinal
level variables. The control variable (3) represents the respondents’ answers to the question, “Do
you feel that you have control over the future and success of your business?” The answer is
coded 1 if the respondent feels that he or she has little or no control over the future of his or her
business, 2 if he or she has some control, or 3 if the respondent feels that he or she has complete
control. Of the 80 observations for this variable, 53 respondents or 66% of the sample said that
they have complete control over the future of their businesses. I found this response rather
surprising given the unpredictable economic climate in Guatemala. 22% said they have some
control, especially citing competition and the prices of materials needed to run their businesses
as factors outside their control. Only 12% or 11 respondents responded that they have little
control over the success of their businesses.18
I found the responses to the next question even more surprising. The hardwork variable
(7) reports the respondents’ answers to the question, “If a person works hard and works a lot,

18

Keep in mind, though, that the wording of this question was imperfect and consequently possibly biased. See the
Research Design section for more details.
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will they have enough money?” This variable is coded 1 if the respondent feels that a person can
work hard, manage money well and still not have enough money to get by, 2 if the respondent
feels that to get by a person has to manage money well in addition to working hard, and 3 if the
respondent feels that if a person works hard they will certainly have enough. Of 92 observations
gathered for this variable, 66% of respondents think that if a person works hard he or she will
certainly have enough to get by on. I found this answer paradoxical. Of 17 respondents who told
me that they were not making enough money to get by on, 11 said that a person would certainly
have enough to get by on if he or she works hard. Most respondents were obviously working
hard; I know this since I interrupted their daily work to ask for ten minutes of their time for an
interview, which ended up taking far longer as I snuck questions in between customers.
22% of respondents said that a hard-working person will have enough to get by on as
long as they manage their money well, and many particularly stipulated that the person must not
“meterse en el vicio,” or become involved in vices like drinking, gambling and prostitution. Only
12% said that it is possible that a person can work very hard and still not have enough to get by
on. These respondents expressed bitterness with the economic and political situation in their
country, saying things like, “Here in Guatemala there aren’t many rewards for working. You can
work a lot and still not have money” (Respondent 64). Many respondents pointed to macroeconomic factors to explain this. According to respondent 87, a woman who earns around $215 a
month making tortillas, “With the economy like it is, you have to fight just to eat.” Often
respondents would mention that “sales are low” (Respondents 61, 68, 93, among others). A man
who sells huipiles, the traditional indigenous women’s blouse, said “It is difficult because of the
economy. There is no work, there’s no business, everything is very expensive” (Respondent 93).
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He continued, “The person who works the most has the least.” When I asked why, he responded
that salaries are too low.
Many people complain of inflation, saying that basic products are substantially more
expensive than even ten years ago. Respondent 53’s store has suffered, she says, since “People
used to consume more, but things are more expensive now. When we started 15 years ago it took
600 quetzals a day to keep product moving. Now it takes 2000 or 3000.” A woman who sells
aprons in a Quetzaltenango market said that ten years ago, “the material cost less,” so it was
easier to get by on the income from the business. Ten years ago, “Everything was better because
things are more expensive now,” according to Respondent 88, who sells women’s underwear in
the same market. Others note the lack of employment, especially for the growing numbers who
are vocational school or university-educated and expect higher-skill jobs than are available.
Respondent 16, a woman who used her $400 microloan to stock her small store with sodas, says,
“If you work hard you can get ahead, but if there aren’t any jobs, that can’t happen.”
From an outsider’s perspective, these opinions seem to be more reflective of the reality in
Guatemala. However, nearly 90% of respondents more or less expressed that any person who
chooses to work hard can get by. I tried to uncover some variables that could explain what kinds
of people are more likely to have this response by running a series of ordered logistic regression
analyses with hardwork as the dependent variable. None of the typical independent variables I
have been using to attempt to measure the impact of receiving a microloan on the respondent’s
opinion on hardwork were significant. Nor were a few new independent variables I tried, such as
average loan amount and number of loans. In various models I included controls for education
level, gender, age, urban or rural home, monthly household income, number of key things
owned, the respondents’ personal rankings of their economic situations, whether the
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respondent’s parent had received loans, and whether the respondent receives remittances. Only
three controls representing average loan amount, gender and economic situation were significant,
and then only sporadically with unimpressive statistics of model fit. For similar tests of control I
found no recurrently significant variables.

Conclusions of Hypothesis 6 Tests
Since only a few variables appear to have much significance, perhaps these beliefs are
more or less cross-cutting across societal strata. Instead of the oft-repeated adages about Latin
American fatalism, this sample depicts Guatemalans with somewhat American-like
entrepreneurial optimism. This finding contradicts my hypothesis that microcredit recipients
would have a stronger sense of economic self-efficacy then non-recipients. Since there is so little
variation in the dependent variables, and various correlation and regression tests show no
relationship between receiving loans and change in those variables, it appears that microcredit
recipients are no more optimistic about their chances in the formal economy than anyone else.
Nor can I definitively pinpoint any other factors that help determine who will have a strong sense
of their ability to ensure welfare through personal action in the economy. Instead it seems that
Guatemalans across the board value hard work and believe it will be rewarded, and feel that they
have ultimate control over the success of their business ventures.

4.2.3 H7: Child career
High-skill Jobs
To test the first part of my seventh hypothesis, that the children of borrowers are more
likely to work in high-skill jobs, I use the ordinal variable adultjob3 (28) as the dependent
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variable in a series of ordered logistic regression analyses.19 This variable records the kind of job
worked by adult children of the respondent. I used the International Labor Organization’s
International Standard Classification of Occupations (2010) to classify each child’s job as lowskill (2) or high-skill (3). The observations for children who are adults but have no job are coded
as 1. Of the 111 adult or self-supporting children of respondents, 13 or about 12% are
unemployed or homemakers, 74 or 67% are employed in low-skill jobs, and 24 or about 22%
have high-skill careers.20 This is a somewhat small sample size, but with decent variation. As
expected given the developing nature of the Guatemalan economy, the bulk of the children are
employed in low-skill jobs.
The results of the ordered logistic regression analyses conducted with adultjob3 as the
dependent variable are presented below in Table 4.13. These tests include the three standard
independent variables (yesornoloan, pctageloan and yesnobusn) as well as six control variables.
Since the parent’s level of education had a major influence on the child’s level of education in
H3, it seems reasonable to think that parent level of education will impact the child’s job choice
as well. I include it as a control. I also include variables measuring the child’s education level,
since education levels should be a major factor influencing a person’s career. In the results

19

I also attempted to test this hypothesis using the underagedream variable, asking children what kind of job they
wanted when they grow up. Unfortunately I only got a sample of 103 children who answered this question, and most
of them said they wanted a high-skill job. Within that small sample, a higher proportion of young children (under
10) wanted low-skill jobs, so the small amount of variance in the variable had a great deal to do with age. For these
reasons no statistically significant results were found when underagedream was used as a dependent variable, and
therefore the results of those tests have been excluded.
20 If the child does not work full-time, is still a student or is too young to be working, this was coded as 0 in the
original adultjob. Adultjob2 contained these zeroes but consolidated some categories. As in previous dependent
variables, to make the variable legitimately ordinal those 0s were excluded, creating variable adultjob3. I used both
adultjob2 and adultjob3 in the same tests, and found that when the former was used, the only statistically significant
variable was age. This is to be expected; age and the 0 value are highly correlated, since most children under the age
of 18 have 0 values for adultjob2. For that reason I do not report the results of the tests using adultjob2, and only
those of adultjob3.
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reported below I used the variable representing whether the child finished the governmentmandatory years of schooling (complete2).
As the models show, all three forms of the independent variable have a positive,
statistically significant effect on the skill level of job taken by the children of respondents. The
models account for around 12 to 13% of the variance in the dependent variable, which is not
huge but substantial enough to warrant attention. First, receiving any loan increases the
likelihood that the respondent’s child will take a high-skill job by about 17% (min!max=.1668).
Next we can conclude that the effect of receiving loans on career choice becomes stronger over
time, since the percent of a child’s life spent with a microloan is not only significant, but also has
a real effect that is not marginal. According to the predicted probabilities in the column next to
Model 13b, changing the percent of the child’s age that his or her parent has received a loan from
its minimum to its maximum decreases the probability of the child being unemployed by about
13%, decreases the probability of the child holding a low-skill job by 42%, and increases the
probability of having a high-skill career by 54% (min!max = -.1250, -.4195, .5444). A 10%
increase in the percentage of age receiving loans yields a 5% increase in the likelihood that the
child will be a high-skill worker (-+1/2= .0049, for a one percent increase in the independent
variable). Also, the effect of receiving a business loan seems to be slightly stronger than that of
receiving home loans or a mix of loan kinds. Receiving a business loan increases the probability
of holding a high-skill job by 21%, as opposed to the 17% effect of receiving any kind of loan
(min!max= .2147). The only significant control variable is completion of mandatory child
education, which also has a positive effect on holding a high-skill job of around 17% to 21%
across the models.
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Table 4.13
Ordered logistic regression on adultjob3 with robust standard errors clustered on respondent
Model 13a
(yesornoloan)

Coefficient

Model 13b
(pctageloan)

Coefficient

Model 13c
(yesnobusn)

Coefficient

1.122*
(.6587)

-.0990,
-.0678, .1668

--

--

--

--

pctageloan

--

--

.0317*
(.0176)

-.1250,
-.4195, .5444

--

--

yesnobusn

--

--

--

--

1.407**
(.6819)

-.1153,
-.0994, .2147

indigenous

-.5779
(.6284)

.0484, .0394,
-.0878

-.8958
(.6646)

.0763, .0549,
-.1313

-.5372
(.6333)

.0438, .0358,
-.0796

urbanrural

.0863 (.3859)

-.0138,
-.0131, .0270

-.0452
(.3400)

-.0071,
-.0068, .0139

.1435
(.3721)

-.0226,
-.0209, .0435

age

.0230 (.0335)

-.0616,
-.0890, .1506

.0173
(.0297)

-.0467,
-.0621, .1088

.0214
(.0347)

-.0564,
-.0796, .1360

female

.0404 (.5098)

-.0032,
-.0031, .0063

.2128
(.5051)

-.0169,
-.0156, .0325

.0292
(.5220)

-.0023,
-.0022, .0045

complete2

.6549**
(.3095)

-.1135,
-.0855, .1990

.5532*
(.3038)

-.0926,
-.0731, .1657

.6986**
(.3083)

-.1194,
-.0871, .2065

parenteduc

.1888 (.1365)

-.0951,
-.1876, .2872

.1626
(.1333)

-.0825,
-.1530, .2355

.2164
(.1350)

-.1039,
-.2195, .3234

!1

.8482 (1.371)

.1291
(1.077)

1.148
(1.382)

!1

4.614 (1.547)

3.948
(1.100)

4.985
(1.609)

Psuedo R2

.1177

.1268

.1346

Wald chisquare

14.42**

16.24**

16.16**

104

104

104

Independent
Variables
yesornoloan

number of
observations

First entry is the unstandardized coefficient, followed by the standard error in parentheses.
***p!.01; **p!.05; *p!.10
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Coefficient = discrete change in the predicted probabilities for a minimum to maximum increase in the independent
variable. Computed using prchange command, looking at the min!max column. First coefficient listed for each
independent variable represents coefficient when dependent = 1, second when dependent = 2, third when = 3.

These tests are the first to provide support for one of my hypotheses, in this case that
involvement in microcredit increases the probability that the child of the borrower will be
employed in a high-skill job. This effect is dependent on time: as the percent of a child’s life
during which her parent receives a loan increases, the likelihood that she will hold a high-skill
job increases. It also seems that business loans are particularly needed for this result to occur.

Formal Sector Jobs
To test the second part of H7, that the children of loan recipients are more likely to take
jobs in the formal economy, I run a series of ordered logistic regression analyses on the
dependent variable adultjobformal2 (Variable 29). It represents whether the child holds a job in
the formal economy. I consider respondent children to be working in the formal sector if they are
employees of an institution like a government agency or large business, own their own large
business that issues receipts, or work most other high-skill jobs. A job is considered to be in the
informal economy if it is an employee position with a small business, if the child owns her own
small business, or if the child works in a parent’s small business that does not issue receipts. Of
97 observations for this variable, 13 children are unemployed, 45 have jobs in the informal
economy, and 39 have jobs in the formal economy.
The results of the ordered logistic regression on adultjobformal2 are presented below in
Table 4.14. Of the three standard independent variables, only receiving a business loan is
significant. Doing so has a positive effect on holding a job in the formal sector. These results are
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Table 4.14
Ordered logistic regression on adultjobformal2 with robust standard errors clustered on
respondent
Independent
Variables

Model 14a
(yesornoloan)

Model 14b
(pctageloan)

Model 14c
(yesnobusn)

Coefficient

.8269 (.7518)

--

--

--

pctageloan

--

.0195 (.0165)

--

--

yesnobusn

--

--

1.191* (.7078)

-.1089, -.1676, .2765

indigenous

-.5071 (.5364)

-.6497 (.5229)

-.4501 (.5269)

.0415, .0643, -.1058

urbanrural

-.1551 (.3563)

-.0830 (.3215)

.2136 (.3341)

.0382, .0631, -.1013

.0444 (.0340)

.0349 (.0290)

.0484 (.0317)

-.1300, -.2993, .4293

-.3738 (.5017)

-.2199 (.5183)

-.4054 (.5174)

.0346, .0626, -.0973

complete2

.4599 (.3564)

.3987 (.3393)

.5080 (.3623)

-.0952, -.1401, .2353

parenteduc

.2568 (.1845)

.2378 (.1877)

.2889 (.1880)

-.1501, -.3703, .5204

!1

1.125 (1.620)

.4166 (1.047)

1.639 (1.532)

!2

.2568 (.1845)

3.039 (1.081)

4.297 (1.710)

Psuedo R2

.1036

.1045

.1197

Wald chisquare

11.48

12.11*

11.82*

96

96

96

yesornoloan

age
female

number of
observations
First entry is the unstandardized coefficient, followed by the standard error in parentheses.
***p!.01; **p!.05; *p!.10
Coefficient = discrete change in the predicted probabilities for a minimum to maximum increase in the independent
variable. Computed using prchange command, looking at the min!max column. First coefficient listed for each
independent variable represents coefficient when dependent = 1, second coefficient when dependent = 2, third
coefficient when dependent = 3.

reported in Model 14c. The model explains around 12% of the variance in the dependent
variable, which again is not extremely large, but is certainly notable. None of the control
variables have a significant effect on being employed in the formal economy. The predicted
probabilities of change in the dependent variable for the independent variables in Model 11c are
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presented in the column next to the model results. Receiving a business loan makes a
respondent’s children 11% less likely to be unemployed, 17% less likely to be employed in a job
in the informal economy, and 28% more likely to hold a job in the formal sector (min->max = .1089, -.1676, .2765).
This test provides more support for my hypothesis that involvement in microcredit
increases the probability that the child of the borrower will be employed in a formal-sector job. It
seems that business loans are particularly needed to produce this outcome. These results even
hold within male and female sub-sections of the data. Among women, receiving a business loan
makes it 25% more likely that the respondent’s child will hold a high-skill job, and increasing
the percentage of a child’s age during which his or her parent has received loans from its
minimum to its maximum increases the probability that the child will have a high-skill job by
60% (min!max= .2547, .6033). Among men, receiving any kind of loan makes it 28% more
likely that the respondent’s child will hold a high-skill job (min!max = .2806).

Conclusions of Hypothesis 7 Tests
Both of the tests presented in this section, the first on adultjob2 and the second on
adultjobformal2, provide evidence in support of my hypothesis that the children of microloan
recipients are more likely to take high-skill jobs in the formal economy than the children of nonrecipients. The first model indicates that time has an influence on this effect; the longer parents
have been receiving loans, the more likely their children will work high-skill jobs. In addition,
both models show that business loans are the most likely form of loan to influence children’s
career in this way.
In light of the previous findings in this study concerning the second-generation effects of
receiving microloans, this conclusion is surprising. I argued that a heightened sense of economic84

self efficacy among borrowers could lead them to encourage their children to take high-skill
formal sector jobs, but I found no relationship between receiving loans and a sense of selfefficacy. I did argue, though, that the reasons behind encouraging children into high-skill jobs
are multifaceted. A simple increase in education and income could also cause the job effect.
However, I did not find that microcredit increases education levels for the second generation.
The only piece of my theoretical puzzle that could explain this outcome, then, is first-generation
increase in income. Since I did find that receiving microloans appears to raise family income
levels, perhaps that change has a direct effect on child job selection.

4.3

H8: Gender effect
This final section centers on the implications of the gendered expenditure preference

hypothesis that female loan recipients will be more likely than men to divert the extra income
generated by the loan to her offspring. I look within the sample of the children of loan recipients
to see if the gender of the parent receiving the loan affects the outcome of the various tests
described in the preceding sections. Namely, these concern child health as measured by illness
incidence (illness) and immunization rates (immun), child education as measured by completion
of the government-mandatory years of schooling (complete2) and last level of education finished
by adult children (adulteduc2), child birthrate as measured by the number of children born to the
offspring of loan recipients (numgrandkids) and their age at first birth (agefirstbirth2), and kind
of child career measured by whether the child has a high or low skill job (adultjob3) and by
whether the child has a job in the formal or informal sector (adultjobformal2). I expect that the
children of female recipients are more likely to exhibit the positive characteristics for each test
than the children of male recipients.
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I ran each of the tests listed above with the appropriate type of regression analysis, just as
I did in their individual tests in the full dataset throughout this section. Since all respondents in
the sample have received loans, I used the yesnobusn variable as an independent variable to see
if receiving business loans affects the dependent variable in each test. I included the variable
parentfemale as the main independent variable to see whether gender has any effect on the
outcomes of the tests (Variable 40). Of 212 children whose parents receive microloans, the loanreceiving parent is female for 170 of those children and the loan-receiving parent is male for 42.
I also included the appropriate control variables for each test, and am finally able to control for
age at first loan (in the place of current age) since the sample is restricted to loan recipients.
I achieved significant results for only one set of hypotheses, those concerning child
education. The results for these two variables can be found below in Tables 4.15 and 4.16. Parent
gender is significant when the dependent variable is either complete2 or adulteduc2. The
independent variable has a negative effect, the opposite of the predicted direction. When a loanreceiving parent is female, her child is 8% less likely to finish the mandatory years of schooling
(min->max = -.0611). The r-squared for this model indicates that the independent variables are
accounting for a little under half of the variance in the dependent variable, and given the level of
significance of the model we can be quite confident that these results are reliable and
noteworthy. The effect of parentfemale on adulteduc2 is even more substantial. As seen in Table
4.16, when a loan-receiving parent is female, her child is 24% less likely to attend university
(min->max = -.2413). It appears, then, that the children of female recipients are not better
educated than those of male borrowers, but rather less educated. The effect is stronger among the
older children making up the adulteduc2 sample, but age at first loan is not significant in that
test, so we know the effect is not due to a lack of exposure to loans.
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Table 4.15
Ordered logistic regression on complete2 by parentfemale with robust standard errors clustered
on respondent
Independent
Variables

Model 15a

Coefficient

-1.196 (1.325)

.0344, .0139, -.0483

-1.855* (.9752)

.0433, -.0178, -.0611

indigenous

-.8359 (.8608)

.0287, .0115, -.0401

urbanrural

1.689*** (.5345)

-.1309, -.0472, .1781

-.1953*** (.0497)

.6930, -.0700, -.7630

-.5162 (.4573)

.0175, .0070, -.0246

.8628** (.4205)

-.2356, -.0728, .3084

yesnobusn
parentfemale

ageloan
female
parenteduc
!1

-2.472 (1.428)

!2

-2.102 (1.483)

Pseudo R2
Wald chi-square
number of observations

.4396
35.553***
167

First entry is the unstandardized coefficient, followed by the standard error in parentheses.
***p!.01; **p!.05; *p!.10
Coefficient = discrete change in the predicted probabilities for a minimum to maximum increase in the independent
variable. Computed using prchange command, looking at the min!max column. First coefficient listed for each
independent variable represents coefficient when dependent = 1, second coefficient when dependent = 2, third
coefficient when dependent = 3.
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Table 4.16
Ordered logistic regression on adulteduc2 by parentfemale with robust standard errors clustered
on respondent
Independent
Variables

Model 16a

Coefficient

-.8227 (1.377)

.0227, .0120, -.0544

-2.165*** (.8034)

.0394, .0810, -.2413

indigenous

-.5924 (1.040)

.0225, -.0067, -.0285

urbanrural

1.493*** (.4618)

-.1156, -.0127, .2180

ageloan

-.0810 (.0786)

.1001, -.0130, -.1345

female

-.2191 (.5295)

.0076, -.0011, -.0113

parenteduc

.3876* (.2080)

-.0667, -.0645, .2677

!1

-3.857 (2.916)

!2

-2.627 (2.669)

!3

-1.296 (2.450)

!4

-.8225 (2.524)

!5

.1827 (2.514)

!6

.0220 (2.477)

!7

1.932 (2.306)

!8

2.288 (2.262)

yesnobusn
parentfemale

Pseudo R2
Wald chi-square
number of observations

.1822
38.30***
66

First entry is the unstandardized coefficient, followed by the standard error in parentheses.
***p!.01; **p!.05; *p!.10
Coefficient = discrete change in the predicted probabilities for a minimum to maximum increase in the independent
variable. Computed using prchange command, looking at the min!max column. First coefficient listed for each
independent variable represents coefficient when dependent = 1, second coefficient when dependent = 5, third
coefficient when dependent = 9
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The lack of significant findings for any of the other variables is puzzling. There is
literature in the field on this question to support every possible outcome: positive, negative, or
null. I did expect to see some influence of gender on these effects in accordance with the
household expenditure preferences literature claiming that women are more likely to allocate
resources to their children. Conversely, my null findings fall in with those scholars who argue
that women and men have very similar household expenditure preferences.
The results of the tests on education, though, imply that when women receive business
loans in particular, the education of their children suffers. Findings throughout this study that run
the same tests on male and female samples must also be considered. My hypotheses for child
health, education and birthrate were upheld in the male samples, but the opposite effect was true
for them in the female samples. Gender seems to have very important effects on the secondgeneration outcomes of microcredit programs, and in most cases the effect appears to be negative
when the borrower is a woman. These conclusions have important implications for microcredit
lenders around the world, many of whom actively encourage women into the practice in hopes of
diverting more resources to female borrowers’ children, and others who hope to use microcredit
as a tool for macro-level development.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
This project was born from a simple thought: if receiving microloans has secondgeneration effects, microcredit could have long-term consequences that most scholars have not
been considering. I decided to investigate, first to see if first-generation changes actually do
occur, and next to see what impact those changes have on the second generation. I tested to see if
microcredit makes individuals better off economically, but then I went further, seeing if
microcredit changed some personal attributes of borrowers, specifically their senses of economic
self-efficacy and level of involvement in the formal economy. I decided that if these three things
– well-being, economic self-efficacy, and formal sector interaction – increased for individuals
due to involvement in microcredit, the changes would impact borrowers’ children in a number of
ways. Their children should be healthier and better educated than those of non-borrowers. The
loan-receiving parent should encourage their children to take high-skill jobs in the formal
economy more than non-borrowers, and to ensure their preparedness for those careers, the
children of borrowers should have fewer children at a later age. I also wondered if these effects
would be stronger when the borrower is a woman. Microcredit programs across the world target
women for a number of reasons, and one is that many policy makers believe that women direct
more of their income to their children than do men. If any of these changes occur due to
microcredit, then it is not only a positive force for recipients but also for their children, creating
longer-term positive effects and a greater impact than currently understood.
What are the effects of taking microloans on the recipients? First, there is evidence to
show that loan recipients feel that their material situation is better than before taking loans. All of
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Table 5.1
Conclusions of Hypotheses
Hypothesis

Result

H1: first-generation income

"

H2: child health

X for complete sample
X for female sub-set
" for male sub-set

H3: child education

N in complete sample
X for female sub-set
" for male sub-set

H4: child birthrate

X for complete sample
X for female sub-set
" for male sub-set

H5: first-generation interaction
with formal economy

"

H6: first-generation economic
self-efficacy

N

H7: child high-skill, formal
economy career

"

H8: female versus male loan
recipients

X for education tests
N for all other tests

" = confirmed, X = denied, N = null

the descriptive statistics point toward a positive correlation between receiving a loan and wellbeing: the number of key possessions owned by recipients increases by one object after receiving
a loan, most recipients think they are “making it” more easily than they were before taking loans,
and the businesses of the respondents I interviewed show an average 120% increase in income
generation after taking loans. There is statistically significant evidence that persons receiving a
microloan feel they are making it on their incomes more easily than non-borrowers: the ordered
91

logistic regression analysis on makingitcurr shows that receiving loans, especially business loans
and any loan received over time, substantively and positively influences the respondents’
perceived economic situation. Some of the regression analyses of the statistics that show a
descriptive change for microcredit recipients yielded no significant results, but it still seems that
receiving microloans does positively affect the economic situation of recipients, and does give
them a better position relative to non-borrowers.
As for the personal effects of receiving microcredit, the surveys show that most
microcredit recipients operate in the informal sector. Furthermore, involvement in microcredit
provides the first interaction with the formal economy for 88% of borrowers, as they are not
already involved through paying taxes or through a regular bank loan. On the other hand,
microcredit programs do not seem to foster a heightened sense of economic self-efficacy, nor do
they seem to simply attract people with it. Instead it seems that Guatemalans across the board
value hard work and believe it will be rewarded, and feel that they have ultimate control over the
success of their business ventures. Of all my findings I am the most cautious concerning this one,
given the difficulty of wording questions that exactly capture the very complicated values I am
trying to measure. Of the three changes I investigate for microcredit recipients, then, there is
evidence that involvement in microcredit leads to a positive alteration in economic situation and
to increased (and usually the only) involvement with the formal sector. However, it does not
appear to alter an individual’s sense of economic self-efficacy.
How do these changes affect the second generation? There is evidence that child health
suffers when a female parent takes a loan, but is positively affected when a father does so. When
the borrower is a father, receiving a loan decreases the probability that the respondent’s children
will have had a serious illness, but that probability increases when the borrower is a woman. The
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effects of receiving loans on child education and on birth rate are similar. Overall, involvement
in microcredit does not seem to affect child education rates. Among male respondents, though,
involvement in microcredit makes it more likely that the child of the respondent has completed
all mandatory years of education. Conversely, involvement in microcredit has a negative effect
on the final education level of adult children when the borrower is a woman. For child birth rate,
microcredit appears to increase the number of children born to the child of a recipient, and
decrease the age at first birth of borrowers’ children. When broken into samples based on gender,
however, the results change slightly. In the male sample, receiving any kind of microloan has a
small, statistically significant and negative effect on the number of children born to the child of a
loan recipient. For female respondents, receiving a loan still has a positive effect on number of
grandchildren, one that is substantially larger than the small negative effect in the male sample.
In other words, the impact of microcredit on birth patterns is the opposite of the effect that I
hypothesized: instead of leading to a decline in fertility, involvement in microcredit leads to a
second-generation increase in birth, but only if the borrower is a woman.
The only hypothesis pertaining to the second generation that is substantiated concerns the
effect of receiving microloans on child career path. The children of microloan recipients are
more likely to take high-skill jobs and more likely to have a career in the formal economy than
the children of non-recipients. These effects are particularly strong when microcredit
involvement is through business loans, and are the same for both male and female recipients.
Finally, are these second-generation effects stronger when the loan recipient is female?
According to my results when the sample is constrained to borrowers, parent gender has no
effect on any of the dependent variables except education. Here it seems that having a female
parent who receives loans actually decreases a child’s level of education. This effect also seems
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to be stronger for older children. The rest of my results in the sample of borrowers show that the
gender of the parent receiving the loan does not importantly affect child health, career path, or
birth patterns. In light of tests throughout this study, though, it seems clear that gender affects
outcomes, and that these outcomes are more negative for female than male borrowers.
Some tests were inconclusive. For the respondents, a few aimed at ascertaining whether
microcredit leads to first-generation gains in well-being yielded no significant results. On the
level of the second generation, receiving microloans does not have a significant effect on child
immunization rates. Given the problems with my research design and the small number of
observations I was able to gather, it is interesting that I actually found significant results for so
many of the tests.
In sum, most of my results show that microcredit has positive first-generation
consequences, but also show that the second-generation effects are quite mixed. As I expected,
involvement in microcredit leads to first-generation increases in economic well-being and
contact with the formal economy. For the second generation, an increase in formal-sector and
high-skill jobs among the children of loan recipients is as I had hypothesized. Improvements in
child health and education and decreased birth rate also result, but only for male borrowers. For
female borrowers, receiving loans increases child birth rate, increases illness propensity and
decreases child education level. These opposite effects are some of the most surprising results in
my study, and illustrate that all policies have unintended consequences. Many scholars and most
policy makers believe that integrating women into business through microcredit has positive first
and second-generation effects, but these results show that they may be mistaken.
Another two hypotheses were refuted, the first concerning the level of economic selfefficacy of borrowers versus non-borrowers. It does not appear that microcredit recipients have a
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stronger sense of economic self-efficacy than non-borrowers. In fact self-efficacy hardly varies
across the sample. It appears that my argument is incorrect that a heightened sense of selfefficacy facilitated by involvement in microcredit causes any of the second-generation effects;
however, my general argument is not hurt, since all of the effects could possibly be caused by
simple material gains. The second refuted hypothesis concerns the gender of the loan-receiving
parent. It seems to have a significant effect on most of the second-generation outcomes, but one
that is opposite to the relationship hypothesized: being a female borrower actually seems to lead
to negative effects for children.
Before we can fully understand the second-generation effects of microcredit programs,
impact analyses must focus on a broader geographical range of institutions. Bangladeshi and
Indian microfinance programs have attracted a great deal of attention, while Latin and
particularly Central American initiatives have received little. Study has also tended to focus on
microcredit’s impacts in very poor countries, but ignores how it affects lives in more developed
ones. For instance, perhaps the household expenditure patterns of men versus women are
different in very poor countries than in developing ones. Those patterns could also be based on
particular cultural characteristics. My results support the stance that men and women distribute
resources in different ways, but maybe this conclusion is not accurate elsewhere, hence the mix
of conclusions on this question in the literature. The effects of any program differ because of
local context, and we cannot know these differences without comparative data.
While my results show that microcredit is generally a positive force in recipients’
immediate economic lives, more scholarship must be devoted to ascertaining how generally we
can assume that this is true. The results presented here point to a moderate increase in firstgeneration well-being, but we need to know how many people see this result, how many have
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great success, and how many actually have greater economic woes after receiving loans on
average. Possible self-selection must also be further investigated. Are people who choose to
become involved in microcredit different from non-borrowers in some substantive way?
According to my results, they do not differ on economic self-efficacy as I have measured it. My
measure has its problems, but even if it is not self-efficacy that separates the groups, perhaps
some basic level of optimism or an economic dimension that I have not captured in my control
variables does tend to differentiate the people who take loans from those who do not. The
attribution dilemma is again at play; how can we know that the children of borrowers are more
likely to take high-skill jobs than their non-borrowing peers due to some influence by
microcredit, when it could be due to some parental attribute that makes the parent more likely to
encourage his or her children to take such jobs as well as to take microloans?
Finally, more study should be devoted to my findings that microcredit involvement leads
to a higher birthrate, lowered education and increased incidence of illness for the children of
female borrowers. What exact mechanism brings about this difference in outcomes based on
gender? This is the most important question that remains to be answered. At first glance we
could assume that, since Guatemala is a socially traditional society and women are very much in
charge of childcare, when they take business loans they become more busy with work and have
less time for their children. When a man takes a loan, on the other hand, the increased income
that he generates can be distributed to children without losing the presence of the primary
caregiver in the home. We must investigate this situation as a possible cause of lowered
education and increased illness. In terms of increased birth rate, how do the resources of one
generation translate into an increase in number of members of the third generation? Does this
effect depend on certain circumstances; for instance, must the children of loan recipients live in
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the same household as the borrower? And why does this effect only occur when the borrower is a
woman? Many questions remain to be answered before we can truly understand the effects of
microcredit, both for the first generation and beyond.
Although further research is needed to fully clarify the effects of microcredit, my study
yields interesting preliminary conclusions that are highly relevant to aid organizations,
microfinance institutions and even the governments of developing countries. From a policy
perspective, perhaps the immediate effect is the most salient, so my finding that microcredit does
tend to make respondents better off supports the use of microcredit as a poverty alleviation tool.
However, these effects seem to be fairly modest, especially since the only significant regression
analysis concerned the way respondents perceive their economic situation. It is possible that
receiving loans makes you feel proactive, but has little substantive effect on your actual situation.
Also, respondents may feel a sense of loyalty to the organization – especially in the case of FGE,
since it fosters such close connections between clients and asesores – so loan recipients may
over-estimate the effect of the loan either consciously or unknowingly for that reason. In any
case, my study does not make microcredit appear to be a magic bullet. First generation changes
tend to be modest. This has major policy implications as institutions evaluate different programs
for poverty reduction. Any organization that is considering implementing a microcredit program
is aware of the costs of doing so, but they need to know that the return on that investment may be
marginal. By conducting cost-benefit analysis, it may prove that other poverty reduction
programs, for instance conditional cash transfer or microfinance savings plans, may yield a better
immediate return for the same investment.
The second-generation impacts of microcredit shown in this study have significantly
more worrisome practical implications. Most microcredit organizations have assumed that
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positive second-generation effects follow microloans, but the nature of these effects has been
unclear since few scholars have directly focused their attention on them. My preliminary results
show that second-generation effects depend on the gender of the parent, and being a female
recipient negatively affects the second generation. When borrowers are male, positive secondgeneration effects of microcredit can apparently be harnessed. Receiving microloans lowers child
propensity to serious illness for male borrowers, an effect that would likely be more pronounced
in poorer countries where the overall incidence of disease is higher. Male parent involvement in
microcredit leads to a higher level of child education, which is important for the career and
income paths of children. It also lowers the birth rate of the male borrower’s children, indicating
that they are delaying childbirth for the benefit of their careers.
All of these results flip for female borrowers. At present microcredit organizations
actively encourage female participation, and far more women than men take part in microcredit
around the world. Microfinance organizations target women for a number of reasons, one being
that women are assumed to direct more of their income to their children than men. My results
show that this may not be the case. Perhaps when women take microloans and become involved
in a business they have less time at home to take care of their children. Although women may
still be targeted for involvement in microcredit for other reasons such as empowerment, policy
makers must be aware that drawing women into microcredit may have important negative effects
for their children. While the immediate effects of receiving microcredit may be positive for the
first generation, then, the net long-term effects could actually be negative.
The only finding that does not depend on parent gender concerns child career path. Little
study has been devoted to this question, so policy makers and scholars alike probably do not
know that the children of loan recipients appear to be more likely to take high-skill jobs in the
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formal economy, an effect that is stronger when the parent has received business loans in
particular. This effect might be the most important one, since a child’s career is probably the key
variable in determining his or her own quality of life. If receiving a loan does increase the
probability that the child will hold a high-skill job in the formal sector, it may not be so
important that it also increases child illness incidence, decreases education and increases
birthrate for the children of female borrowers, since that child will go on to get a higher-paying
job anyway. Scholars should investigate the causal mechanism behind this important positive
effect so that policy makers are able to cultivate this second-generation increase in modern jobs.
Even when focusing on only the positive first- and second-generation effects of
microcredit, we need to keep in mind that macro-level troubles dwarf many micro-level gains.
Most respondents mentioned in some form or another that prices are too high and sales too low,
and some indicated that there are not enough high-skill jobs for all of the newly qualified
candidates. Grassroots-type poverty alleviation efforts will not be enough to independently spur
macro-level development. Certain structural conditions, especially inflation and unemployment
in high-skill sectors, must be addressed before programs like microcredit can have a major effect.
A final note of interest to policy makers is that particular kinds of loans have different
effects. Business loans have the most obvious impact, but qualitatively, business loans in
conjunction with home loans also seem to be helpful. Receiving a home loan does not really
improve the family’s financial situation; in fact, families who receive only home loans are more
likely to report that they struggle to pay the loan each month. Obviously, people receiving only
home loans do not have a concurrent increase in income, so finances become even more strained.
Taking a home loan does result in a quite immediate and dramatic improvement of quality of
life, however. Institutions involved in microcredit should consider this carefully. Perhaps the best
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solution is to begin families with a business loan, and if their business grows enough to provide
sufficient income to pay both the business and a new home loan, then the client should be
encouraged to take the latter. This would harness the income-increasing potential of business
loans, while also affording clients the immediate improvement of better living conditions.
However, policy makers must keep in mind the possible negative effects to the second
generation of giving business loans to women. In that context it is possible that giving home
loans is the safest bet, if not the option that yields the greatest immediate economic benefit.
The findings presented in this thesis highlight a number of important first- and secondgeneration effects of involvement in microcredit programs. I provide cautious evidence that
microcredit positively affects the lives of borrowers, but show that the common knowledge
concerning the second-generation effects of these programs is not quite correct. With this more
nuanced knowledge of the second-generation effects of microcredit, institutions like the United
Nations and USAID will be better equipped to make funding decisions. This study is only one
piece in the puzzle, however. We must have information from a wide variety of countries and
cultures before decision makers are able to truly understand the benefits, drawbacks and cost
effectiveness of microcredit programs. Hopefully my research draws attention to this deficit and
spurs closer study as the second-generation effects and long-term possibilities of microcredit
become clearer in the coming years.
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Appendix:
Frequencies of Major Variables
Variables
adulteduc2

Frequency

Mean/Median

Children who have had no formal education =
8
Children who stopped with some or all
primary school = 33

Mean = 5.24

Range
1-9

Median = 5
(graduated básicos)

Children who stopped during or after básicos
= 15
Children who took some years of career or
graduated from career = 36
Children who are currently enrolled in
college, took some, or graduated = 20
adultjob3

Unemployed child = 13

Mean = 2.104

Child employed in low-skill job = 68

Median = 2

1-3

Child employed in high-skill job = 24
adultjobformal2

Unemployed child = 13

Mean = 2.27

Child employed in informal-sector job = 45

Median = 2

1-3

Child employed in formal-sector job = 39
age

Mean, kids = 15.61
Median, kids = 14
Mean, respondents
= 37.85
Median,
respondents = 37

agefirstbirth2

Child under 18 when gave birth for first time
=7
18-19 = 19
20-21 = 18
22-29 = 11

complete2

Children who have not completed the
appropriate years of schooling = 55
Children who are behind in appropriate
schooling by less than 2 years = 6
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Mean = 20
Median = 20

Kids:
1 month – 52
years
Respondents:
20 years – 68
years
16-29

Children who have completed the appropriate
amount of schooling = 200
control

Respondent feels as if he or she has little or
no control over future of business = 7
Some control = 20

Mean = 2.58

1-3

Median = 3

Complete control = 53
educ

Respondents received no formal education =
8

Mean = 4

1-9

Median = 3

Respondents who stopped with some or all
primary school = 48
Respondents who stopped during or after
básicos = 15
Respondents who took some years of career
or graduated from career = 15
Respondents who are currently enrolled in
college, took some, or graduated = 10
female

Male = 131 children, 27 respondents

0-1

Female = 168 children, 70 respondents
hardwork

illness

Respondent feels that a person can work hard,
manage money well and still not have enough
money to get by = 11
Respondent feels that a person can work hard
but has to manage money well to get by = 20
Respondent feels that if a person works hard
they will certainly have enough = 61

Mean = 2.54

1-3

Median = 3

Children who have not had a serious illness =
230

0-1

Children who have had a serious illness = 61
indigenous

Indigenous = 146 kids, 43 respondents

0-1

Non-indigenous =160 kids, 54 respondents
loanhistory

Respondent never received loan = 31
Respondent borrowed from unofficial source
before taking microloan = 5
Microloan was respondent’s first loan = 56

Mean = 3.04

1-4

Median = 4

Normal bank loan was respondent’s first loan
=5
makingitcurr

Respondent feels that the family currently
does not have enough to get by on = 22
Respondent feels that the family currently has
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Mean = 2.06
Median = 2

1-3

just enough to get by on = 37
Respondent feels that the family has enough
to get by on and to save = 27
makingitpre

Question not applicable = 20

Mean = 1.23

Respondent feels that the family did not have
enough to get by on before receiving loans =
22

Median = 1

0-3

Respondent feels that the family barely had
enough to get by on before receiving loans =
27
Respondent feels that the family had enough
to get by on and to save before receiving
loans = 5
numgrandkids

Children who have not yet had children of
their own = 245

Mean = .43

0-7

Median = 0

Children with one child = 16
With 2 = 17
With 3 = 16
With 4 =
With 5-7 = 4
parentfemale

Male = 73 children have male parent

0-1

Female = 233 children have male parent
pctageloan

Never received a loan = 94 children, 29
respondents
Up to 25% of life receiving loan = 71
children, 59 respondents
Up to 50% of life receiving loan = 79
children, 7 respondents
Up to 75% of life receiving loan = 23
children

Kids
Mean = 29.73%

0% - 100%
(kids)

Median = 23%
0%-38%
(respondents)
Respondents
Mean = 8.71%
Median = 8%

Up to 100% of life receiving loan = 39
children
receipts

Respondent that do not issue receipts = 75

0-1

Respondents that issue receipts = 20
remitt

No one in home receives remittances = 85
respondents
Someone receives remittances and relies on
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1-3

them a little = 9
Someone receives remittances and relies on
them heavily = 3
urbanrural

Respondent lives in rural area = 29

1-3

Respondent lives in semi-urban area = 26
Respondent lives in urban area = 41
yesnobusn

Never received a business loan = 156
children, 51 respondents

0-1

Received a business loan = 150 children, 46
respondents
yesornoloan

Never received a loan = 94 children, 29
respondents
Received any kind of loan = 212 children, 68
respondents
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0-1

Codebook: Respondents Dataset

1.
2.

VARIABLE
NAME
age
aveloanamt

3.

control

4.

educ

What was the last year of
school that you completed?
(Section 3, Q8)

5.

female

Section 3, Q1

6.

govmoney

Do you or does someone
who lives in your home
receive money from the
government, for example
from the Mi Familia
Progresa program or a
retirement pension? (Section
3, Q6)

QUESTION WORDING
How old is are you?
Takes average of reported
loan amounts; see Survey
Section 1A, Q1
Do you feel that you have
control over the future and
success of your business?
(Section 1, Q7)
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VALID RESPONSES
Number indicates age of respondent
Number indicates calculated
average amount of loans received,
in quetzals
1 = respondent feels as if she has
little or no control over future of
business,
2 = some control,
3 = complete control
1 = respondent received no formal
education,
2 = respondent received some
primary school education,
3 = respondent finished primary
school (6th grade),
4 = respondent received some
secondary education,
5 = respondent finished secondary
education (3o basico),
6 = respondent took some years of
career (Bachillerato, Magisterio,
Perito Contador, Secretariado) OR
graduated from technical school,
7 = respondent graduated from
career,
8 = respondent attended but did not
graduate university or is currently
enrolled,
9 = respondent graduated university
0 = male respondent,
1 = female respondent
0 = respondent does not receive
welfare-type money from
government,
1 = respondent receives money
from Mi Familia Progresa or other
government program,
2 = someone in home is retired and
receives pension from government

7.

hardwork

Do you think that if a person
works hard and a lot, they
will have enough money?
(Section 1, Q8)

8.

incomebuspct

9.

indigenous

Took percent increase or
decrease in per-month
income of business before
and after receiving loans; see
Survey Section 1, Q5 and
1A, Q4
Do you consider yourself
indigenous or
ladino/mestizo/mezclado?
(Section 3, Q3)

1 = respondent feels that a person
can work hard, manage money well
and still not have enough money to
get by,
2 = respondent can work hard but
have to manage money well to get
by,
3 = respondent feels that if a person
works hard they will certainly have
enough
Number indicates percent increase
or decrease in business income after
taking loan

0 = respondent does not identify as
indigenous,
1 = respondent identifies as
indigenous

10. indivgroup

Do you receive your loan
1 = no loan
individually or with a group? 2 = individual
3 = duo
4 = group
5 = home improvement

11. loanhistory

Derived from Section 1A,
Q1

12. makingitcurr

Right now, the money that
you make and the total
family income: a) are
enough for you to get by on,
and you can save, b) are just
barely enough for you to get
by on, or c) are not enough
for you to get by on.
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1 = Never received loan.
2 = Received loan from unofficial
source.
3 = Borrowed from unofficial
source before taking microloan.
4 = microloan first loan.
5 = normal bank loan first loan –
over Q25,000.
1 = The current total family income
is not enough to get by on.
2 = The current total family income
is just barely enough to get by on,
and leaves no extra for saving.
3 = The current total family income
is enough to get by on and allows
for saving.

13. makingitpre

(Section 1, Q10)
Before taking your first loan,
the money that you made
and the total family income:
a) was enough for you to get
by on, and you could save,
b) was just barely enough
for you to get by on, or c)
was not enough for you to
get by on. (Section 1A, Q5)

14. numberloans

Derived from Section 1A,
Q1

15. parentloansyesno

Has one of your parents
received a small loan for
their business? If so, which
parent and during how many
years? (Section 1, Q9)
Calculated by dividing
number of years the adult
has been receiving
microcredit by the adult’s
total age.
Do you issue receipts?
(Section 1, Q3)

16. pctageloan

17. receipts

18. remitt

Do you or does someone
who lives in your house
receive remittances from
outside of the country? If so,
to what point does your
family income depend on the
remittances: a lot, a little, or
very little? (Section 3, Q7)
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0 = Question not applicable.
1= The total family income before
receiving loans was not enough to
get by on.
2 = The total family income before
receiving loans was just barely
enough to get by on, and left no
extra for saving.
3 = The total family income before
receiving loans was enough to get
by on and allowed for saving.
Number indicates total number of
microloans received from all
institutions
0 = neither parent ever received
loans,
1 = one or both parent received a
loan or loans
Number indicates percentage of
adult’s life during which he or she
has received any type of loan

0 = does not issue receipts
1 = does issue receipts

1 = no one in home receives
remittances,
2 = someone in home does receive
remittances but they do not depend
heavily on them for household
expenditures,
3 = someone in home receives
remittances and they depend on
them somewhat,
4 = someone in home receives
remittances and they depend on
them heavily.

19. situation

20. things

21. thingsploan

22. urbanrural

23. yesnobusn

24. yesornoloan

25. yrsoldloan

Do you consider that your
current economic situation is
better or worse than before
you received loans? (Section
1A, Q6)

:0 = Respondent has never taken
loan.
1 = Respondent considers his
current economic situation to be
worse than before taking loans.
2 = Respondent considers his
current economic situation to be the
same as before taking loans.
3 = Respondent considers his
current economic situation to be a
little better than before taking loans.
4 = Respondent considers his
current situation to be significantly
better than before taking loans.
Could you tell me if you
0 = respondent currently does not
have in your home: a
have a television, cell phone,
television, a refrigerator, a
refrigerator, microwave nor
cellular telephone, a
computer,
microwave, a computer.
1 = respondent has one of these
(Section 3, Q9)
things,
2 = respondent has 2… etc.
Before receiving microloans, 0 = after receiving a loan, there is
which of these items did you no change in the number of things
have in your house?
the respondent has. Negative
Television, refrigerator,
numbers up to 5 indicate things the
cellular telephone,
respondent had before the loan but
microwave, computer.
not after. Positive numbers up to 5
(Section 3, Q10)
indicate things the respondent
acquired after receiving the loan.
0 = rural
1 = semi-urban
2 = urban
Derived from Section 1A,
0 = parent has never received a
Q1
business loan,
1 = parent has received a business
loan
Have you received a small
0 = parent has never received loan,
loan for your business or
1 = parent has received a loan, past
home? (Section 1, Q11)
or present.
Derived from Section 1A,
Number indicates the number of
Q1
years since first loan was received
from any institution
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Codebook: Children Dataset
VARIABLE
NAME
26. adulteduc

QUESTION WORDING

VALID RESPONSES

This variable was created by
using the data from the
following question, then
dropping out the
observations of any child still
enrolled in school or any
child too young to be
enrolled in school. In other
words, the variable only
includes observations for
children who have completed
the schooling they plan to
attend.

0 = child is currently enrolled in
school, not yet an adult.
1 = child received no formal
education,
2 = child received some primary
school education,
3 = child finished primary school
(6th grade),
4 = child received some secondary
education,
5 = child finished secondary
education (3o basico),
6 = child took some years of career
(Bachillerato, Magisterio, Perito
Contador, Secretariado) OR child
graduated from technical school,
7 = child graduated from career,
8 = child attended but did not
graduate university,
9 = child is currently enrolled in
university,
10 = child graduated university
0 = child is not an adult, or living
independently.
1 = child has no job.
2 = child has low-skill or is
studying low-skill career job.
3 = child has high-skill job or is
studying high-skill career.
4 = child works in parent’s loan
business, or primary business if
they do not receive loans.
5 = child works in other parent’s
non-loan business.
0 = child is not an adult or is not
living independently,
1 = child has no job,
2 = child has low-skill job,
3 = child has high-skill job

What was the last year of
school that your child
completed? (Section 2, Q7)

27. adultjob

What is the occupation or
type of job that your child
has? (Section 2, Q13)

28. adultjob2

Derived from Section 2,
Q13.
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29. adultjobformal

Derived from Section 2,
Q13.

30. age

What is the age of your child
in years? (Section 2, Q2)
Does your child have
children of his/her own? If
so, how old was your child
when his/her first child was
born? (Section 2, Q9)
Derived from yrsoldloan
variable in respondent
dataset, and child’s current
age
Has your child completed all
appropriate years of
schooling for his/her age?
(Section 2, Q8)

31. agefirstbirth

32. ageloan

33. complete

34. female

Section 2, Q1

35. illness

Has your child had any
serious illness during his/her
childhood? (Section 2, Q4)
Did your child receive
his/her vaccinations?
(Section 2, Q5)
Derived from Section 3, Q3:
Do you (the parent) consider
yourself indigenous or
ladino/mestizo/mezclado?

36. immun

37. indigenous
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0 = child is not an adult or is not
living independently,
1 = child has no job,
2 = child has job in informal
economy (employee in small
business, owns small business,
works with parent loan business
that is informal),
3 = child has job in formal economy
(employees of large business, any
high-skill job, owns large business
that gives receipts)
Number indicates age of child
Number indicates age of child when
her first child (respondent’s
grandchild) was born.

Number indicates age of child when
parent took first loan/small loan. 0
indicates that child was not yet
born.
0 = Child is too young to attend
school.
1 = Child did not complete all years
of school for his age.
2 = student is behind by less than
three years.
3 = Child completed all normal
years of school for her age.
0 = male child,
1 = female child
0 = Child has never had a serious
illness.
1 = Child has had a serious illness.
0 = Child did not receive all free
immunizations.
1 = Child did receive all.
0 = parent identifies as nonindigenous,
1 = parent identifies as indigenous

38. numgrandkids

39. parenteduc

40. parentfemale
41. pctageloan

42. underagedream

43. urbanrural

44. yesnobusn

If your child has children of
his/her own: how many?
(Section 3, Q9)
What was the last year of
school that you completed?
(Section 3, Q8)

Number indicates number of
children the child has.

1 = respondent received no formal
education,
2 = respondent received some
primary school education,
3 = respondent finished primary
school (6th grade),
4 = respondent received some
secondary education,
5 = respondent finished secondary
education (3o basico),
6 = respondent took some years of
career (Bachillerato, Magisterio,
Perito Contador, Secretariado) OR
graduated from technical school,
7 = respondent graduated from
career,
8 = respondent attended but did not
graduate university or is currently
enrolled,
9 = respondent graduated university
Derived from Section 3, Q1
0 = parent (repondent) is male,
1 = parent (respondent) is female
Calculated by dividing
Number indicates percentage of
number of years the child has child’s life that his or her parent has
been exposed to microcredit received any type of loan
by the child’s total age
If the child is under the age
0 = child is an adult or living
of 18, still enrolled in school independently, or child does not
or living at home, or
have any dream for future career.
otherwise is not living
1 = child wants low skill job.
independently: What
2 = child wants high skill job.
occupation does your child
want to have when he/she
grows up? (Section 3, Q11)
0 = rural,
1 = semiurban,
2 = urban
Derived from Section 1A,
0 = parent has never received
Q1
business loan,
1 = parent has received business
loan
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45. yesornoloan

Derived from question to
parent: Have you received a
small loan for your business
or home? (Section 1, Q11)
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0 = parent has never received loan.
1 = parent has received a loan, past
or present.

Appendix: Survey
Numero del sondeo: _________
Rural / Urbano / R-U
Sucursal: __________________
Hora de empezar: _____:_____
Día de entrevista: ___________
Metodología: individual / grupal / no cliente
Sección 1: Préstamos
1. ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que usted realiza?
________________________________________________________________________
2. ¿Usted tiene un negocio propio? sí / no
Si afirmativa:
¿Su negocio lo comparte con alguien más: esposa(o), hermano(a), amigo(a) otros? Si / no
3. ¿Usted emite facturas? si / no
4. ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realiza?
________________________________________________________________________
5. Actualmente, ¿cuánto dinero entra por mes a su casa en total? ¿De su negocio?
__________________________________________________________________________
6. ¿Cuántas personas en su hogar tienen trabajo? _______
¿Quien, que hacen, y cuanto dinero entra a su casa de sus empleos?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
7. ¿Usted siente que tiene control sobre el futuro y éxito de su negocio?
Sí, mucho / Regular / No mucho / No, para nada
8. ¿Usted cree que si una persona trabaja mucho y duro, que esta persona va a tener bastante
dinero? sí / no / depende
______________________________________________________________________________
9. ¿Alguno de sus papás ha recibido pequeños préstamos para el negocio? Sí / no
a. ¿Quién? Madre____Padre _____ los dos_________
b. ¿Durante cuantos años? Madre _____ Padre ______
10. Ahora mismo, el dinero que usted recibe y el total del ingreso familiar:
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(a) Les alcanza bien, pueden ahorrar.
(b) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades.
(c) No les alcanza, tienen dificultades.
11. Usted ha recibido un pequeños préstamo para su negocio o vivienda? Sí / no
Si la respuesta es afirmativa: sigue con la Sección 1
Si la respuesta es negativa: vaya a la Sección 2
12. ¿Recibe los préstamos actualmente, o en el pasado? / de Génesis o no
Actualmente / en el pasado
Sección 1A: Para los que reciben préstamos
1. ¿De cuales instituciones ha recibido los préstamos? ¿Durante cuantos años trabajaba con
cada uno? ¿Cuánto dinero recibe / recibió por cada préstamo, y cuántos préstamos recibe
/ recibió cada año? Si ha recibido un préstamo de una fuente informal, anotar de quien.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
2. ¿Para qué usa / usaba el dinero de los préstamos?
________________________________________________________________________
3. ¿A qué se dedicó (en qué trabajaba) usted principalmente antes de recibir los préstamos?
________________________________________________________________________
4. Antes de recibir los préstamos, ¿cuánto dinero entró por mes a su casa? ¿De su negocio?
________________________________________________________________________
5. Antes de recibir los préstamos, el dinero que usted recibía y el total del ingreso familiar:
(a) Les alcanzaba bien, podían ahorrar.
(b) Les alcanzaba justo sin grandes dificultades.
(c) No les alcanzaba, tenían dificultades.
6. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es peor o mejor que su situación
antes de recibir los préstamos? Mejor / igual / peor
7. ¿Usted ha recibido capacitación de Génesis Empresarial / banco? si / no
Si es afirmativa:
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i.
ii.
iii.

¿Después de haber recibido capacitación considera que su negocio ha mejorado?
si / no
¿Considera que la capacitación le han ayudado para mejorar los ingresos? si / no
¿Las capacitaciones recibidas le han ayudado? si / no
a. ¿Cómo le han ayudado?
_______________________________________________________________

Sección 2: Hijos
¿Usted tiene hijos? Sí / no
Si afirmativa: sigue con la Sección 2
Si negativa: vaya a la Sección 3
¿Cuántos hijos tiene? _____
¿Cuántos hijos viven en su hogar en este momento? _____
Preguntas sobre el hijo/a mayor:
1. ¿Hombre o mujer? H / M
2. ¿Edad en años? _______
3. ¿Su hijo puede leer y escribir en español? Sí / no
4. ¿Su hijo tuvo/ha tenido alguna enfermedad grave durante su niñez?
No / Sí ________________________________
5. ¿Su hijo recibió las vacunas? Sí / Algunas / No
¿Por qué no?___________________________________
6. ¿Su hijo actualmente asiste a la escuela? sí / no
7. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que su hijo aprobó?
Ninguno 0
Primaria 1 2 3 4 5 6
Secundaria (Básicos: primero básico, segundo
básico, tercero básico) 7 8 9
Bachillerato, Magisterio, Perito Contador o Secretariado (Secundaria) 10 11 12
Universitaria 13 14 15 16 17 18+
Superior no universitaria (explicar) ___________________________
8. ¿Su hijo ha cumplido todos los años de escuela para su edad? sí / no
Si negativa: ¿Porque?
i. Para ayudar con mi negocio
ii. Para ayudar con trabajos de la familia
iii. La escuela es demasiado cara o es muy difícil llegar allí
iv. Para conseguir trabajo
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v. Para empezar su propio negocio
vi. Otro __________________________
9. ¿Su hijo tiene hijos propios? sí / no
i. ¿Cuántos? ________ / no sé
ii. ¿Cuáles son sus edades? _______________________________ / no sé
iii. ¿Cuántos años tenía su hijo cuando nació su primer hijo propio? ______
10. ¿Su hijo es menor de edad? Si / no
a. Si es un niño, vaya a las preguntas en Caja 1
b. Si es un adulto, vaya a las preguntas en Caja 2
Caja 1: Menor de Edad
11. ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que su hijo quiere tener cuando sea mayor?
__________________________________
12. ¿Su hijo hace algún trabajo, o ayuda la familia con algo?
____________________________________

Caja 2 - Adultos
13. ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realiza su hijo? ________________________
14. ¿Recibe préstamos para microempresa? Sí / no
a. Si afirmativa: ¿Trabaja en la misma empresa que usted? sí / no
15. ¿Su hijo sigue viviendo en su pueblo natal, o ha mudado? Quedado / mudado
a. Si ha mudado: ¿A donde mudó? ___________________
b. Si ha mudado: ¿Por qué cree usted que su hijo mudó?
i. Para encontrar un trabajo mejor
ii. Para encontrar trabajo, porque es difícil encontrar uno aquí
iii. Otro _______________
Si tienen más que 2 hijos, sigue con páginas extras para los otros hijos.
Si solamente tiene un hijo, vaya a la siguiente pregunta.
Preguntas sobre el hijo/a mayor:
1. ¿Hombre o mujer? H / M
2. ¿Edad en años? _______
3. ¿Su hijo puede leer y escribir en español? Sí / no
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4. ¿Su hijo tuvo/ha tenido alguna enfermedad grave durante su niñez?
No / Sí ________________________________
5. ¿Su hijo recibió las vacunas? Sí / Algunas / No
¿Por qué no?___________________________________
6. ¿Su hijo actualmente asiste a la escuela? sí / no
7. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que su hijo aprobó?
Ninguno 0
Primaria 1 2 3 4 5 6
Secundaria (Básicos: primero básico, segundo
básico, tercero básico) 7 8 9
Bachillerato, Magisterio, Perito Contador o Secretariado (Secundaria) 10 11 12
Universitaria 13 14 15 16 17 18+
Superior no universitaria (explicar) ___________________________
8. ¿Su hijo ha cumplido todos los años de escuela para su edad? sí / no
Si negativa: ¿Porque?
i. Para ayudar con mi negocio
ii. Para ayudar con trabajos de la familia
iii. La escuela es demasiado cara o es muy difícil llegar allí
iv. Para conseguir trabajo
v. Para empezar su propio negocio
vi. Otro __________________________
9. ¿Su hijo tiene hijos propios? sí / no
i. ¿Cuántos? ________ / no sé
ii. ¿Cuáles son sus edades? _______________________________ / no sé
iii. ¿Cuántos años tenía su hijo cuando nació su primer hijo propio? ______
10. ¿Su hijo es menor de edad? Si / no
a. Si es un niño, vaya a las preguntas en Caja 1
b. Si es un adulto, vaya a las preguntas en Caja 2
Caja 1: Menor de Edad
11. ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que su hijo quiere tener cuando sea mayor?
__________________________________
12. ¿Su hijo hace algún trabajo, o ayuda la familia con algo?
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Caja 2 - Adultos
13. ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realiza su hijo? ________________________
14. ¿Recibe préstamos para microempresa? Sí / no
a. Si afirmativa: ¿Trabaja en la misma empresa que usted? sí / no
15. ¿Su hijo sigue viviendo en su pueblo natal, o ha mudado? Quedado / mudado
a. Si ha mudado: ¿A donde mudó? ___________________
b. Si ha mudado: ¿Por qué cree usted que su hijo mudó?
i. Para encontrar un trabajo mejor
ii. Para encontrar trabajo, porque es difícil encontrar uno aquí
iii. Otro _______________
Sección 3: Preguntas demográficas
1. Mujer o hombre? (m/h)
2. ¿Cuántos años tiene? ______
3. Usted se considera…
(1) Indígena
(2) Ladino / mestizo
(3) Otro__________
4. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que ha hablado de pequeño en su casa?
(1) Sólo Español
(2) Mam
(3) K’iche’
(4) Kaqchiquel
(5) Q’eqchi’
(6) Otro _____________
5. ¿Usted puede leer y escribir en español? Sí / no / un poco
6. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe dinero del gobierno, por ejemplo del programa
“Mi Familia Progresa”/jubilado? Sí (explica) _______________________ / no
7. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas (dinero) del exterior? si / no
a. ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del
exterior? Mucho / algo / poco / nada
8. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?
Ninguno 0
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Primaria 1 2 3 4 5 6
Secundaria (Básicos: primero básico, segundo
básico, tercero básico) 7 8 9
Bachillerato, Magisterio o Secretariado (Secundaria) 10 11 12
Universitaria 13 14 15 16 17 18+
Superior no universitaria
9. Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen
a. televisor sí / no
b. refrigeradora sí / no
c. teléfono celular sí / no
d. microondas sí / no
e. computadora sí / no
Si recibe o ha recibido micropréstamos, termina con esta pregunta:
10. Antes de recibir los préstamos para su negocio, en su casa tenían
a. televisor sí / no
b. refrigeradora sí / no
c. teléfono celular sí / no
d. microondas sí / no
e. computadora sí / no
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